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SOME KIND OF HEARING OFFICER
Kent H. Barnett
Abstract: In his prominent 1975 law-review article, “Some Kind of Hearing,” Second
Circuit Judge Henry Friendly explored how courts and agencies should respond when the
Due Process Clause required—in the U.S. Supreme Court’s exceedingly vague words—
“some kind of hearing.” That phrase led to the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test,
under which courts weigh three factors to determine how much process or formality is due.
But the U.S. Supreme Court has never applied Mathews to another, often ignored, facet of
due process: the requirement for impartial adjudicators. As it turns out, Congress and
agencies have broad discretion to fashion not only “some kind of hearing” but also some kind
of hearing officer.
Scholars, Congress, and even federal agencies have largely ignored so-called “informal”
agency hearings and the hearing officers who preside over them, despite their large number
and significance. Unlike well-known administrative law judges, the lack of uniform
treatment of and data on these federal hearing officers renders it difficult to monitor,
compare, and improve the systemic design and fairness of informal hearings. To better
understand this “hidden judiciary,” this Article first reports, based on rare access to agencies,
the most comprehensive empirical data assembled on those adjudicators’ independence. The
data confirm the significant variety of federal hearing officers and the lack of uniform
impartiality protections. To improve data collection, transparency, and salience of these
hearing officers, this Article proposes a disclosure framework—appropriated from consumer
contexts—to detect, compare, and improve prophylaxes to protect hearing officers from
improper agency influence.
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INTRODUCTION
Agency adjudication gets little attention. But when it does, the alleged
unfairness of the proceedings is usually at issue. Take the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) as an initial example. Encouraged by
statistical findings reported in the New York Times and the Wall Street
Journal, parties in SEC proceedings criticized the SEC’s adjudicators for
favoring their agency during “in house” proceedings.1 This criticism of
1. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 (last visited Apr. 2,
2019); Gretchen Morgenson, At the S.E.C., A Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-of-home-courtedge.html [https://perma.cc/B98D-7WAT] (contrasting SEC’s 88% win rate in administrative law
judge (ALJ) hearings to 63% win rate in district courts). That said, Urska Velikonja has argued that
a proper interpretation of the data, including summary dispositions, indicates that the SEC ALJs
were not biased. See generally Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased?
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the SEC led prominent U.S. District Judge (and SEC detractor) Jed
Rakoff to take note, remarking that the SEC had won 100% of its
administrative actions in 2014 as compared to 61% in court.2 Moreover,
a former SEC administrative law judge stated that the agency had
“questioned [her] loyalty to the SEC” because she ruled against the
agency.3
As another example, Department of Justice officials in the George W.
Bush Administration were accused of unlawfully hiring and firing
immigration judges based on their political views.4 And indeed, a later
investigation confirmed the politicized hiring.5 Around this time, federal
judges criticized immigration judges for their lack of professionalism
and impartiality.6 Although the Justice Department has reformed its
hiring practices,7 immigration judges have recently made news again
when the Trump Administration sought to impose aggressive caseprocessing goals and affirmance rates, which judges must meet or face

An Empirical Investigation, 92 WASH. L. REV. 315 (2017). Velikonja could not say how strong the
SEC’s cases were in either forum. See id. at 363–64. Another empirical study concluded that “the
SEC [is] shifting more marginal cases from court to administrative proceedings or bringing actions
as administrative proceedings that would not have been brought at all pre-Dodd-Frank.” Stephen J.
Choi & A.C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment,
34 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 32 (2017).
2. Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Criticizes SEC Use of In-House Court for Fraud Cases, REUTERS
(Nov. 5, 2014, 10:47 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-fraud-rakoff/u-s-judge-criticizessec-use-of-in-house-court-for-fraud-cases-idUSKBN0IP2EG20141105
[https://perma.cc/MQ33KKVD]; see Amended Complaint at 19–20, Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-01801-LMM (N.D. Ga. May
29, 2015), 2015 WL 4307088.
3. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 (last visited Apr. 20,
2019). Other ALJs at other agencies have made similar complaints. See Robert J. McCarthy,
Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 184, 213
(2012) (collecting cases).
4. See, e.g., Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for
Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 362, 380–81 (2008) (citing Carol Marin, Patronage
“Crime” Does Pay — for Justice Dept., CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, at B6); Amy Goldstein &
Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on GOP Ties, WASH. POST (June 11, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001229.html
[https://perma.cc/5D4H-S8R6].
5. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY
MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (July 28,
2008), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/59D7-M3J6] [hereinafter
ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING].
6. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases from other
circuits).
7. See ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING, supra note 5, at 65.

04 - Barnett (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

6/18/2019 7:57 PM

518

[Vol. 94:515

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

firing.8 For those judges with dockets that include numerous timeconsuming immigration claims,9 they will be incentivized to have
limited hearings and to deny claims. Recently, President Trump,
annoyed by the immigration court backlog, went so far as to argue that
immigrants who arrive at the border and seek admission or asylum
should receive no hearings,10 perhaps in contravention of due process.11
Quickly denying claims is, in fact, the Trump Administration’s
preference.12
As a final example, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has
angered patent holders with its unique control over decisions by its
Appellate Board (PTAB). The Director of the PTO does not have direct
decisionmaking authority,13 but the director can require rehearings for
decisions from three-judge PTAB panels.14 On rehearing, the Director

8. Tal Kopan, Justice Department Rolls Out Case Quotas for Immigration Judges, CNN (Apr. 2,
2018, 8:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/02/politics/immigration-judges-quota/index.html
[https://perma.cc/RU8G-727B]; see also EOIR PERFORMANCE PLAN: ADJUDICATIVE EMPLOYEES,
http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/04/02/immigration-judges-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7CUCLWE].
9. See Russell Wheeler, Amid Turmoil on the Border, New DOJ Policy Encourages Immigration
Judges
to
Cut
Corners,
BROOKINGS
(June
18,
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/06/18/amid-turmoil-on-the-border-new-doj-policyencourages-immigration-judges-to-cut-corners/
[https://perma.cc/S5WK-ABEQ]
(discussing
differences in dockets and realistic case-processing dockets for judges with different kinds of claims).
10. See Donald J. Trump (@POTUS), TWITTER (June 25, 2018, 5:43 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1011228265003077632 [https://perma.cc/X6W5-7GQ8]
(“Hiring manythousands [sic] of judges, and going through a long and complicated legal process, is
not the way to go - will always be disfunctional [sic]. People must simply be stopped at the Border
and told they cannot come into the U.S. illegally.”); Donald J. Trump (@POTUS), TWITTER (June
25,
2018,
5:45
AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1011231137233080321
[https://perma.cc/G3TT-L24T] (“If this is done, illegal immigration will be stopped in it’s [sic]
tracks - and at very little, by comparison, cost. This is the only real answer - and we must continue
to BUILD THE WALL!”).
11. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“But once an alien enters the country,
the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.”).
12. See Kopan, supra note 8 (quoting former immigration judge Paul Schmidt saying,
“[e]valuating somebody’s performance on the number of cases they close is obviously going to have
some effect on the substance of the decisions. . . . [T]he boss wants removal orders, not grants—all
those things have to have some sort of effect.”).
13. See generally Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency
Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141 (2019) (discussing the PTAB’s unique structure and its place
within the traditional models of federal agency adjudication).
14. Id. at 178 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2018)).
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can add additional judges of his or her choosing and require additional
rehearings until he or she gets the sought-after result.15
What may come as a surprise is that the fairness of these
proceedings—the matter at issue in each example—is largely left to
Congress and the agencies to which Congress delegates. In a prominent
1975 law review article, Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly explored
how courts and agencies should proceed when, in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s words, the Due Process Clause mandates “some kind of
hearing.”16 That phrase led to the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge17
balancing test, in which courts consider three factors to determine how
much process is due.18
But the Court has never applied Mathews to another, often ignored,
facet of due process that is at issue in the introductory examples: the
requirement for impartial adjudicators.19 Due process, the Court has
made clear, forbids an adjudicator from deciding cases in which the
adjudicator has actual bias.20 Yet, because actual bias is difficult to
detect, due process mostly considers the unconstitutional risks of
partiality based on the adjudicator’s selection, professional and

15. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, USPTO Admits to Stacking PTAB Panels to Achieve Desired
Outcomes, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/08/23/uspto-admitsstacking-ptab-panels-achieve-desired-outcomes/id=87206/
[https://perma.cc/95H8-ND4S]
(discussing government’s concessions at oral argument in Yissum Research Dev. Co. v. Sony Corp.,
626 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Former immigration judges and members of the Board of
Immigration Appeals have recently claimed that the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of
Immigration Review has taken a particular case from a local immigration judge and turned the case
over to an Assistant Chief Immigration Judge to alter its outcome. After the local judge sought
briefing on a particular issue, the matter was reassigned to the Assistant Chief Immigration Judge,
who had the immigrant removed in absentia without briefing. STEVEN ABRAMS ET AL., AM.
IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, RETIRED IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND FORMER MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO LATEST ATTACK ON JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE (2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/retired-ijs-former-bia-mems-attack-on-judindepend [https://perma.cc/EJ8M-QMHX].
16. Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (1975) (quoting
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1974)) (“The Court has consistently held that some
kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property
interests.”).
17. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
18. Id. at 334–35.
19. In one of its impartiality decisions, the Court applied the Mathews framework, as one would
expect, to a separate question of whether “additional administrative or judicial review” was
necessary. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 198 (1982). But it did not apply those factors to the
partiality questions. See id. at 195–97.
20. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009) (“The judge’s own inquiry
into actual bias, then, is not one that the law can easily superintend or review, though actual bias, if
disclosed, no doubt would be grounds for appropriate relief.”).
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pecuniary interests, and other relationships to the parties.21 The Court’s
few cases on partiality—especially in the federal administrative
context22—leave the boundaries of due process opaque, even as the
Court has expressed increased concern over adjudicators’ risk of
partiality in various contexts.23 As a result, Congress and federal
agencies have significant discretion to create not only “some kind of
hearing” but also some kind of hearing officer.
Federal administrative law judges (ALJs) are Congress’s best-known
attempt to construct a cadre of adjudicators with optimal protections
concerning impartiality—referred to as “impartiality protections”
throughout this Article. ALJs number more than 1,90024 and oversee “on
the record” (or, colloquially, “formal”) hearings.25 Drafted in 1946
largely in response to concerns over unprofessional and partial federal
agency adjudicators in the early twentieth century,26 the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) assigns responsibility for hiring ALJs to an
independent agency, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).27 The
APA also applies impartiality protections—reminiscent of those that due
process has considered, such as oversight, pay, and removal—to all

21. See id. at 883–84.
22. The two most relevant decisions are McClure, 456 U.S. 188, and Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S.
302 (1955). McClure held that the hiring of hearing officers by insurance companies to decide
certain reimbursement claims did not create an unconstitutional risk of partiality because the
government, not the employing insurers, paid any claims. McClure, 456 U.S. at 196. In Marcello,
the Court rejected the partiality challenge against immigration hearing officers based on “the longstanding practice in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in the
federal courts, and . . . the special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may
take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration matters.” Marcello,
349 U.S. at 311.
23. See, e.g., Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873 (holding that state supreme court justice had to recuse
after one party to the appeal provided disproportionate donations to justice’s campaign); WilliamsYulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015) (recognizing state’s significant interest
in preserving judicial appearance of impartiality when upholding Florida’s banning of judges from
personally soliciting campaign donations); Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1899,
1910 (2016) (holding that unconstitutional risk of partiality exists when judge had earlier significant
involvement in prosecution of defendant’s case).
24. See Administrative Law Judges: ALJs By Agency, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/servicesfor-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency
[https://perma.cc/8FFU-D5JG]
(listing 1931 ALJs by their agencies, as of March 2017).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2018); see also id. §§ 556, 3105.
26. See Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices to
Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3–9, 43–45 (1997).
27. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 3105.
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ALJs.28 As the earlier-mentioned loyalty check on a former SEC ALJ
demonstrates, these protections may provide a necessary buffer from
agency pressure. Notably, however, the Trump Administration has
recently weakened them. For decades, OPM independently rated
attorneys and required agencies to choose ALJs from a list of three
candidates.29 The Administration, with OPM’s blessing, has now given
agencies nearly complete discretion in choosing which lawyers to hire as
ALJs.30 And the Administration has advocated for an expansive
interpretation of “good cause” for ALJs’ removal.31
But ALJs comprise only a fraction of administrative adjudicators.
When it enacted the APA, Congress intended ALJs to preside over most
federal agency evidentiary hearings.32 But doctrinal changes in the past
decades, among other things, have permitted agencies to instead use
non-ALJ hearing officers (“non-ALJs” or “hearing officers,” for short),33
for whom Congress almost never provides guidance.34 Agencies are left
in charge of protecting their hearing officers’ impartiality and their
hearings’ fairness, even when the agency itself is a party to the dispute.
Since at least the early 1990s, non-ALJs have outnumbered federal
ALJs.35 But because these adjudicators go by numerous titles, oversee
28. See id. § 554(d) (providing limitations on certain ex parte contacts and supervision by certain
agency officials); id. § 556(b) (requiring impartiality); id. § 3105 (providing ALJs separation of
functions); id. § 7521 (limiting removal of ALJs).
29. See VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN
OVERVIEW 2–3 (2010).
30. See Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018) [hereinafter Exec. Order].
The new process moves ALJs to the excepted service (thus not part of a competitive hiring process)
and gives agency heads direct and nearly limitless discretion in hiring, subject to other statutory
constraints. See infra Section I.C.1.
31. See Memorandum from The Solicitor Gen. on Guidance on Admin. Law Judges after Lucia v.
SEC (S. Ct.) to Agency Gen. Counsels 9 (on file with author).
32. S. REP. NO. 752, at 207 (1946), reprinted in COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, at 268 (1947); U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 41–43 (1947)
(arguing that formal adjudication applied to nearly all hearings required by statute).
33. See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1662–65
(2016).
34. The most important exception is for certain Board of Contracts Appeals Judges, who have
some or all of ALJs’ protections. All of those judges must be appointed like ALJs from a register by
the hiring agency (although without OPM involvement). See 41 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1), (b)(2), (d)(2)
(2018). One group of theses judges has the same protection from at-will removal that ALJs have. Id.
§ 7105(b)(3) (same protection as ALJs from at-will removal for Civilian Board of Contract Appeals
Judges); id. § 7105(a) (no protection for Armed Services Board Judges); id. § 7105(c) (no protection
for Tennessee Valley Authority Board Judges); id. § 7105(d) (no protection for Postal Service
Board Judges).
35. See infra Section II.B (discussing prior studies of non-ALJs).
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various types of hearings for agencies across the federal administrative
state, and lack uniform characteristics and protections, they toil away
largely unnoticed. Their invisible nature leads to a vicious cycle: the
government, aside from occasional scholarly projects,36 does not collect
information on them, and without much information, they largely escape
scholars’, policymakers’, and even regulated parties’ attention.
Accordingly, non-ALJs, as Professor Paul Verkuil has said, are the
federal government’s “hidden judiciary.”37
This Article seeks to turn the vicious cycle into a virtuous one. In
Part I, it first considers the need for impartiality protections. Fortunately,
the Court’s due process jurisprudence and the APA identify important
impartiality protections.
From there, Part II presents a subset of empirical findings to
determine whether non-ALJs (via statute or agency action) share similar
impartiality protections with ALJs. Along with three co-authors
(including two political scientists), I conducted research based on
surveys of agencies and prepared and presented a report for the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), the
independent federal agency charged with providing research and
recommendations to Congress and agencies to improve the federal
bureaucracy.38
Our findings, in brief, demonstrate that non-ALJs’ prominence within
the federal bureaucracy has grown significantly. First, agencies reported
10,831 non-ALJs who go by twenty-three different titles. Non-ALJs
outnumber the 1931 reported ALJs by more than 5:1.39 These non-ALJs
hear a variety of matters, including hearings for regulatory enforcement,
government-benefits, disputes between private parties, government
contracts, licensing, and federal employment disputes.40

36. See infra note 142 (referring to the studies by Raymond Limon and John Frye). ACUS also
sponsored the project from which the data reported in this article derives.
37. Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1341, 1345 (1992).
38. See About, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., https://www.acus.gov/#node-7 [https://perma.cc/2HYX7XNM] (“ACUS is an independent federal agency charged with convening expert representatives
from the public and private sectors to recommend improvements to administrative process and
procedure.”).
39. See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing how the “Limon Study” reported 3,370 non-ALJs and
discussing the significant increase in patent examiners, the largest group of non-ALJs by a wide
margin); infra tbl.1.
40. For a thorough and thoughtful examination of administrative adjudication between two
private parties, see Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, 72
VAND. L. REV. 425 (2019).
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Non-ALJs’ impartiality protections were similarly heterogeneous. We
asked agencies about, among other things, their hiring qualifications,
limitations on non-adjudicatory duties, reporting relationships with the
agency (a.k.a. “separation of functions”), limitations on ex parte
communications, the non-ALJs’ physical separation within the agency,
performance appraisals and eligibility for bonuses, and protection from
at-will removal. We learned that agencies give some hearing officers
significant forms of independence and others very little. Moreover, they
often do so in ways, such as through custom or internal documents,
which lack the transparency, clarity, and permanence of statutes or
rulemaking.41 Indeed, certain responses to our survey indicated that
current impartiality protections are for some agencies so opaque that the
agency’s non-ALJs themselves are unaware of their precise contours.
To obtain more useful data and assessments of other hearing officers,
Part III proposes a uniform, one-page agency impartiality disclosure like
those used in consumer transactions. As indicated in the draft disclosure
in Appendix A, this uniform impartiality disclosure would be a single
page with a table that identifies the existence (or not) of each protection,
a brief description of and citation for each, and an opportunity to justify
the absence of any factor. Agencies would send the disclosure to
nonagency parties at the initiation of a hearing, post the disclosure online
with their other hearing-related materials, and submit the original and
revised forms to a clearinghouse—such as ACUS, which provides
research and recommendations to agencies and Congress for synthesis
and analysis.
These disclosures will further numerous ends for Congress, the
Executive Branch, and litigants in agency proceedings. First, disclosure
will provide a synopsis of non-ALJs’ impartiality protections,
information which might be dispersed throughout various authorities.
Second, disclosure can alert agencies and litigants that the hearing
officer lacks important protections and suffers an “impartiality gap,” i.e.,
a gap between existing and model impartiality protections. By
identifying impartiality gaps, disclosure can help nudge agencies across
the federal government to think more about their programs and turn to
substantive recommendations.42 Third, the proposed disclosure form’s
identified criteria help Congress oversee how agencies across the
administrative state use their delegated discretion. Fourth, disclosure can
provide interest groups a means to focus agency and congressional
41. See infra Part II.
42. See infra note 274.
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attention on so-called informal adjudication. Finally, disclosure has the
virtue of recognizing litigants’ dignitary interests by helping them
understand the process to which they are subject.
Of course, disclosure is often a second-best regulatory response—and
perhaps a cynical one that seeks only to calm political impulses to
ineffectively address underlying substantive problems.43 Congress could
more directly regulate hearing officers’ protections (and likely should).44
Yet, it has refrained from doing so, perhaps because of ideological
preferences, concerns over hindering agency flexibility, its inability to
find agreement as to details, apathy, or the lack of information on nonALJs’ current status. The proposed disclosures, however, are at the very
least a useful start in providing interested parties and Congress more
data to assess whether broader and more uniform changes to non-ALJs’
impartiality protections are necessary or appropriate. As in the consumer
space, disclosure likely provides the most workable way of protecting
impartiality.
I.

TOWARD OPTIMAL IMPARTIALITY PROTECTIONS

Optimal process is a means of reducing decisionmaking errors.
Because due process only guarantees minimal process for certain kinds
of bureaucratic decisionmaking, optimal process for agencies requires
congressional codification or congressional delegation to agencies for
promulgation. This Part considers optimal impartiality protections for

43. See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why,
127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1596–97 (2014) (arguing that “choice-limiting” forms of regulations may
often prove optimal, but behavioral law and economics’ choice-enhancing regulation will further
political consensus); Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1090, 1093 (2007) (noting that disclosure can function as “regulationlite” to appease those who would “ordinarily oppose regulation”); William C. Whitford, The
Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400, 436 (1973).
44. I am skeptical that non-ALJ impartiality protections, unlike hearing procedures, should be
tailored to specific non-ALJs or programs; instead, impartiality concerns are very likely the same in
all contexts. After all, the Court has not engaged in Mathews balancing for impartiality as it has for
other procedures. Accordingly, I am inclined to support statutory impartiality protections for all or,
at least, most non-ALJ hearings. But because agencies and scholars often worry that useful
differences across agencies and regulatory programs belie uniform treatment, see, for example,
Emily S. Bremer, Designing the Decider, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 81 (2017) (“The
principal—and most frequently invoked—benefit of agency procedural discretion is that it enables
an agency to design its processes in a manner best suited to meet the unique needs of that agency
and the regulatory program at issue.”). I am taking a more conservative approach here by seeking to
increase data on non-ALJs (and allowing agencies to explain when they choose not to impose
certain impartiality protections) before considering the suitability of uniform provisions.
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non-ALJs and helps identify the benefits of a model impartiality
disclosure in Section III.A.
A.

Nature and Purpose of Optimal Protections for Impartiality

Optimal decisionmaking is not perfect decisionmaking. It is, instead,
a process that seeks to achieve net benefits “up until the point at
which . . . marginal benefits and costs are . . . roughly equal as far as we
can tell.”45 Evaluating optimal (or even minimally required) process is
famously and necessarily context-specific46 and requires the designer to
identify the benefits sought (such as legitimacy, transparency, dignitary
acknowledgment, or correct outcomes) and the costs incurred (such as
pecuniary expense, diversion of resources from more meaningful
problems, or bureaucratic lethargy).47 Despite the economic patina of
cost-benefit optimal process, optimal process is as much art and
educated intuition as science.48
One of the main goals of optimal process is, or should be, to temper
improper motivations. Public-choice theory views administrative
decisionmaking as a contested settlement between various interest
groups,49 including agency officials, regulated parties, putative
regulatory beneficiaries, and congressional and presidential principals.
Each group has its own interests that it seeks to advance despite their
potential inconsistency with the public welfare or governing legal
standards. By permitting the airing of evidence, allowing the challenging
of evidence, and requiring reasoned decisionmaking, procedure can
neutralize improper self-interested motivations of agency officials in
particular.

45. Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673, 693 (2015).
46. Friendly, supra note 16, at 1270 (stating that Professor Kenneth Culp Davis “was
undoubtedly right when he observed in 1970, ‘[t]he best answer to the overall question of whether
we want more judicialization or less is probably that we need more in some contexts and less in
other contexts’” (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE: 1970
SUPPLEMENT § 1.04-9, at 34 (1971))).
47. See id. at 1276, 1303–04. For instance, Friendly wrote that he “would draw a distinction
between cases in which government is seeking to take action against the citizen from those in which
it is simply denying a citizen’s request.” Id. at 1295.
48. See Vermeule, supra note 45, at 693 (discussing JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE:
JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS 13 (2013)). Indeed, these uncertainties will likely render it
impossible to determine when process has become optimal, and the competition between different
values (for example, expertise, accountability, and impartiality) can render the normative goal
highly debatable. See id. at 677, 693–94.
49. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 551 (2002) (describing public-choice theory).

04 - Barnett (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

6/18/2019 7:57 PM

526

[Vol. 94:515

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Aside from tempering improper motivation, optimal process can also
mitigate cognitive errors and thereby improve decisionmaking. 50 People
rely on various mental shortcuts (or, in psychological jargon, heuristics)
and organizing schema to process complex stimuli and information.51
Both can be useful. Take, for instance, relying on political parties as a
heuristic to choose between policy options when lacking the time or
inclination to research. Relatedly, schema can help recognize and
process familiar stimuli and provide signals, such as that the woman in a
black robe in the front of a courtroom is the judge. But they can also lead
to errors.52 Heuristics can lead to incorrect conclusions, such as that
noteworthy events, like airplane crashes, happen more than they do.53
And over-reliance on schema based on racial, gender, or socio-economic
stereotypes can prevent the use of information gathered from actual
encounters.54 Imposing a process for decisionmaking, such as requiring
reason giving or limitations on evidence that one may consider, can
mitigate these errors.
One key element of optimal process is the presence of an impartial
decisionmaker. Impartiality can further both goals of optimal process. It
can significantly limit conscious or unconscious motivated reasoning.
For instance, a decisionmaker whose job or pay are controlled by one of
the parties has reason to favor that party. It can also mitigate cognitive
errors that may arise when the adjudicator has professional or personal
relationships with a party or a person whose interests the decision may
significantly affect.
But process has costs. In the impartiality context, one could advocate
for all adjudicators to have the same protections as Article III judges—
with offices that last during “good [b]ehaviour” and salaries that do not
diminish.55 Obviously, however, this kind of protection is very
financially costly, and it ties Congress’s hands in structuring the
government. Other protections for adjudicatory independence may
provide sufficient comfort, such as requiring good cause for removal or
limiting an employing agency’s ability (as opposed to Congress) to
reduce or increase the hearing officer’s pay. Relatedly, agency
adjudicators may present different concerns than judicial officers

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at 553–54 (“[P]oor decisions are often the result of fallibility rather than culpability.”).
Id. at 555–56.
See id. at 558.
Id. at 556 (discussing the “availability heuristic”).
See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 132–33 (2d ed. 1991).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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because they work for agencies that combine executive, quasi-judicial,
and quasi-legislative functions.
B.

Due Process’s Limitations

Despite some similarities, due process is minimal—not optimal. Due
process has a grand provenance and important place within American
notions of justice.56 But, whether under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments, its domain is limited in numerous ways, and its
indeterminate requirements set a procedural floor. This Section briefly
discusses the limitations and requirements as most relevant to the nonALJs in Part II and the proposed disclosure in Part III.
Due process does not apply to all agency adjudications. It applies only
to deprivations of “life, liberty, or property.”57 In the administrative
context, deprivations of property are most germane. Due process applies
to the government’s efforts to take away an individual’s “legitimate
claim of entitlement” based on mutual expectations from state law or
some other source of law outside of the Due Process Clause itself.58 This
inquiry does not capture certain agency action, such as most
adjudications that deny applications for benefits59 or that concern the
refusal to rehire an individual with only a unilateral hope of
reemployment.60 Once due process applies, it requires fairly little.61 At
its core, due process mandates only “some kind of hearing”62 before the
government deprives one of a protected interest. That hearing must
provide the affected party sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard

56. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1681–1703 (2012).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
59. See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.4, at 758–59, 780–83 (5th
ed. 2010). Pierce notes that the authority that bestows property interests, such as state legislatures or
Congress, can and have prevented property interests from forming in awarded benefits by expressly
stating that the benefit at issue does not create an individual entitlement, thereby undermining any
contrary mutual expectation. See id. at 758–59.
60. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
61. See Emily S. Bremer & Sharon B. Jacobs, Agency Innovation in Vermont Yankee’s White
Space, 32 J. LAND USE 523, 531–32 (2017) (describing due process’s minimal role in agencydesigned procedures).
62. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n.7.

04 - Barnett (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

6/18/2019 7:57 PM

528

[Vol. 94:515

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

before an impartial decisionmaker.63 The decisionmaker must provide a
brief statement of reasons for the decision.64
As to the impartiality requirement, the U.S. Supreme Court has
directed courts to look for either actual bias or risk of bias. The former is
extremely rare because judges often are not aware of their own biases
and the direct proof or strong inferential evidence of a judge’s
predisposition against a party is extremely difficult to establish.65
Accordingly, almost all impartiality claims concern the unconstitutional
risk of bias. In that context, courts consider whether the decisionmaker
has a financial interest in the decision (either personally66 or for a
program that the decisionmaker administers67); institutional loyalty,
psychological pressure, or compulsion;68 a party’s influence in the
decisionmaker’s selection;69 and other relationships between the
decisionmaker and the litigating parties.70 Yet even with these factors,
courts have generally been forgiving in the administrative context.71
Some, in fact, have criticized the Court’s case law on impartiality in the
administrative state as “poorly reasoned . . . [and] feebly attempting to
distinguish between the due process limits imposed on judicial and
administrative adjudication.”72

63. Friendly, supra note 16, at 1279–91.
64. Id.; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (noting that “[t]he fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner’” (citation omitted)).
65. See Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 2011
BYU L. REV. 943, 967.
66. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520, 535 (1927).
67. See Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60–62 (1972).
68. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196 n.10 (1982). The Court has suggested in the
separation of powers context that an official’s ability to remove a subordinate official at-will may
implicate impartiality. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
493, 507 n.10 (2010).
69. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884–86 (2009).
70. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the relationship between a judge and a
former law associate or partner could be problematic. See McClure, 456 U.S. at 197 n.11.
71. See, e.g., id. at 196–97 (holding that hearing officers employed by insurance carriers were not
partial because the government paid their salaries and ultimately the claims at issue); Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955) (holding that the decisionmaker’s reporting to officials in the
agency with investigative or prosecutorial functions did not present impartiality concerns “when
considered against the long-standing practice in deportation proceedings, judicial approved in
numerous decision in the federal courts, and against the special considerations applicable to
deportation which the Congress may take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion
in immigration matters”).
72. Martin H. Redish & Kristin McCall, Due Process, Free Expression, and the Administrative
State, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 297, 299 (2018).
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Even assuming the Court would apply due process’s impartiality
norms with gusto in the administrative context, due process would have
little bearing on the perceived failings in the introductory examples.
High SEC-win rates in agency hearings over a few years, by themselves,
do not indicate that the decisionmakers are biased or suggest why they
might have a risk of bias. The internal pressure on a former SEC ALJ is
more troubling, but given her statutory protections from the agency’s
retaliation,73 the pressure is unlikely to be sufficient to raise due
process’s hackles. For immigration judges, due process likely has
nothing to say about political hiring by itself; the Appointments Clause
permits political consideration in hiring officers,74 employees,75 and even
Article III judges.76 The fact that the Department of Justice is not a party
in the immigration-removal litigation (the Department of Homeland
Security is) further mitigates concerns over the appointment alone.77
And the PTAB rehearings, although unorthodox, are not obviously of
constitutional concern. As a matter of black-letter law, agency heads can
reverse adjudicator decisions without deferring at all to the initial
decision.78 The fact that PTAB permits the same end through a clunky
process does not change the fact that an agency superior retains
decisionmaking authority.
C.

Devising Optimal Process

The Due Process Clause, accordingly, leaves optimal process to
policymakers. Whether public or private, these policymakers—
Congress, agencies, or private organizations—must consider various
values at stake, balance them against their costs, and consider how
comprehensive procedural schemes should be. As relevant to agency
adjudication, Congress has attempted to do so for so-called formal
adjudication, but it has largely delegated the duty to agencies for
informal adjudication.

73. These statutory protections are discussed in detail infra at Section I.C.1.
74. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
75. See Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (citing United States v.
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879)) (noting that Appointments Clause does not apply to
employees).
76. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
77. See KENT BARNETT ET AL., NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS,
SELECTION, OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL 46 n.137 (2018).
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2018).
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Procedural Code

A single code that governs all agency proceedings is beneficial
because it simplifies design choices across the bureaucracy for common
procedural matters, aids individuals in interacting with different agencies
across the bureaucracy, and—if well designed—elevates the overall
quality of agency process by displacing lesser agency procedures. But
comprehensive statutes can be counterproductive if they reach matters
that are too diverse to ensure that the procedures’ benefits overcome
their costs.79 Thus, comprehensive procedure may work for only certain
kinds of decisionmaking, and policymakers must consider when
additional categorization is necessary or when additional process must
be unique to a particular agency’s action.
The APA is an attempt to provide government-wide process for three
of four forms of agency decisionmaking.80 The APA divides all
administrative action into not just adjudication and rulemaking, but a socalled formal and informal version of each kind of action. Only one of
the four forms of agency decisionmaking—informal adjudication—lacks
significant statutory requirements.
For formal adjudication that an agency must make “on the record,”81
the APA generally requires an ALJ to preside over what is usually a
trial-like evidentiary hearing.82 Parties are usually entitled to receive
notice of hearing and grounds for the asserted issues,83 present oral or
written evidence, cross-examine witnesses,84 propose findings of fact
79. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV.
297, 305 (1986).
80. See Vermeule, supra note 45, at 682 (stating that it is “unlikely that the [APA’s] compromise
[over separation-of-functions for certain kinds of adjudication] is optimal in any strong sense, but
historically it was designed to protect multiple values, each to some degree but none fully, and in
that weaker sense has an optimizing character”). Aside from these transubstantial procedural
requirements, Congress often provides additional or different procedural requirements for particular
agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., 1 PIERCE, supra note 59, § 7.7 (discussing hybrid rulemaking that
requires more than informal rulemaking but less than formal rulemaking). These hybrid
requirements can further optimal procedure. See Friendly, supra note 16, at 1268.
81. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
82. Id. The APA probably allows inquisitorial hearings in which the ALJ helps develop the
record. The Social Security Administration uses inquisitorial hearings, which are governed by a
separate statute that served as the basis for the APA’s formal-adjudication provisions. See Paul R.
Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 704
n.103 (2002); Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Are You Willing to Make the Commitment in Writing? The APA,
ALJs, and SSA, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 203, 209 (2002).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b). The APA has a specific notice provision for notice when the agency seeks
to revoke or suspend a granted license. Id. § 558(c)(1).
84. Id. § 556(d).
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and conclusions of law,85 and obtain a decision from the agency based
on the exclusive hearing record.86
Of formal proceedings’ characteristics, perhaps the most significant is
the use of ALJs. Unlike almost all other federal administrative
adjudicators, ALJs’ oversight and removal are governed by statute and
OPM regulations. They are prohibited from engaging in prosecutorial or
investigative duties or reporting to an agency official who does.87 They
are generally prohibited from having ex parte communications with
agency officials, parties, or others about a fact in issue.88 ALJs are
exempt from civil-service performance reviews, and they cannot receive
bonuses from their agencies.89 Agencies can discipline or remove ALJs
only for “good cause” as determined by the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB), another independent agency, after an on-the-record
hearing.90
In crafting these protections for ALJs, the drafters of the APA
intended to address the most pressing criticisms concerning the
appearance of partiality in agency adjudications,91 and they expected
ALJs to oversee nearly all statutorily required hearings.92
Notably, ALJs’ relationship with their agencies has recently changed.
Congress delegated authority over the ALJ-hiring process to OPM when
it created ALJs,93 and OPM’s method of hiring, with some adjustments,
had been in place since immediately after the APA’s enactment.94 Under

85. Id. § 557(c).
86. Id. § 557(b) (initial and recommended decisions); § 556(e) (requiring exclusive record). The
same goes for on-the-record rulemaking. § 553(b) (requiring notice of the rulemaking hearings);
§ 556(a) (establishing that its requirements apply to formal adjudication and rulemaking), except
that the ALJ need only create a record and not issue a decision, id. § 557(b) (not requiring initial or
recommended decisions in rulemakings).
87. See id. § 554(d)(2).
88. See id. § 554(d)(1).
89. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1655–56.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
91. See Gifford, supra note 26, at 3–9, 43–45.
92. S. REP. NO. 752, at 207 (1946), reprinted in COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 32
(arguing that formal adjudication applied to nearly all hearings required by statute).
93. See 5 U.S.C. § 1305 (delegating authority for OPM to enact regulations, among other things,
for ALJ hiring under 5 U.S.C. § 3105).
94. See Paul R. Verkuil et al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 771, 931 (1992)
(“[T]hen-professor Antonin Scalia [noted] ‘it was evidently contemplated that the Civil Service
Commission [OPM’s predecessor agency] would establish qualifying requirements by general rule,
and that the agencies would then select from among all individuals who met those requirements.’”).
Since it issued its first regulations in 1947, immediately after the APA’s enactment, OPM’s
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the old system, ALJs were hired via a merit-based system—with a
written exam, interviews, and rankings—led by OPM for decades.95
After ranking the candidates, OPM would send the appointing agency
the top three scoring candidates.96 OPM’s process had long been
criticized for its scoring formula, its refusal to consider subject-matter
expertise, and its slow or limited hiring process.97 These criticisms
suggest that OPM hiring was not operating optimally, even if it did
provide some useful separation between the agency and hiring decisions.
The hiring process recently changed when OPM, despite its status as
an independent agency98 with statutory authority over the ALJ-hiring
process,99 agreed to follow President Trump’s July 2018 Executive
Order on ALJ hiring.100 That order, in short, called for removing OPM
from the hiring process, permitting agencies to hire ALJs directly, and
allowing agencies (with one minor limitation) to set hiring
qualifications.101 The key changes are that ALJs are no longer hired
under a competitive process and that no intermediary screens applicants.
Whether by design or by accident, the new appointment method
addresses some of the concerns over the OPM process by giving
agencies nearly complete control over the process. Yet, instead of
addressing specific concerns (such as those concerning the scoring
formula or speed), it simply cut the intermediary and merit selection out
of the process altogether. In contrast to the OPM procedure that was
inefficient, the Executive Order may be too efficient.102 The area of ALJ

predecessor used a merit ranking system and limited agencies’ ability to select new ALJs from only
the top three candidates. See id.
95. See Verkuil et al., supra note 94, at 830–35 (discussing original manners of ALJ hiring by
OPM’s predecessor agency, the Civil Service Commission). See generally BURROWS, supra note 29
(outlining ALJ-hiring process as of 2010).
96. See BURROWS, supra note 29, at 2–3; infra note 154 (discussing problems with the ALJhiring process).
97. See Verkuil et al., supra note 94, at 954–55; BURROWS, supra note 29, at 3–6.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 1101 (“The Office of Personnel Management is an independent establishment in
the executive branch.”). Notably, however, the Director of OPM does not appear to have protection
from at-will removal. See id. § 1102(a) (addressing only appointment, not removal).
99. See supra note 93.
100. See generally Office of Personnel Management, Memorandum re: Executive Order—
Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service (July 10, 2018),
https://chcoc.gov/content/executive-order—excepting-administrative-law-judges-competitiveservice [https://perma.cc/97FF-SBW4] [hereinafter OPM Memo].
101. See Exec. Order, supra note 30; OPM Memo, supra note 100. The one requirement that
ALJs must have is a law license. See Exec. Order, supra 30, § 3(a)(ii), at 32756.
102. For a more thorough discussion of the recent changes to ALJ hiring, see Kent Barnett,
Raiding the OPM Den: The New Method of ALJ Hiring, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
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hiring, accordingly, is a developing area that is still looking for optimal
design.
Regardless of the optimal nature of the ALJs’ former or current hiring
process, the APA’s impartiality provisions for ALJs and its specific
consideration of ALJ hiring are especially good candidates for optimal
process because they track due process variables related to impartiality
and provide concrete protections in the administrative context that have
proven workable over decades. First, for instance, the U.S. Supreme
Court has demonstrated its concern over a party’s role—such as,
perhaps, an agency’s—in appointing an adjudicator.103 Second, the APA
includes prohibitions on an agency reviewing or giving bonuses to
adjudicators.104 The Court has recognized that the power of a party or
case outcome to affect the pay an agency official receives affects that
official’s independence.105 Third, the APA prohibits the agency from
removing ALJs without cause,106 and the Court has noted repeatedly that
superiors’ at-will removal permits them to have subordinate officials do
their bidding.107 Fourth, and related to removal, the APA requires a
separation of functions, for which ALJs cannot investigate or prosecute
or report to an agency official who does.108 Although the Court has
indicated that combined functions generally cause no constitutional
concern,109 the separation of functions was a significant addition to the
APA to address concerns over pro-agency adjudicators who would

(July 11, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/raiding-the-opm-den-the-new-method-of-alj-hiring-by-kentbarnett/ [https://perma.cc/GUY5-JBKZ].
103. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884–86 (2009) (holding that a party’s
substantial and disproportionate participation in donating to and supporting judicial candidate
required the elected justice’s recusal).
104. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1655–56.
105. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 197 (1982) (noting that hiring entity had no
interest in the case outcome); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60–62 (1972) (holding that due
process did not permit adjudicator to decide matters whose outcome affected a budget for which he
was responsible); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520–22, 535 (1927) (holding that due process did
not permit adjudicator to adjudicate matters whose outcome affected his pay).
106. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018).
107. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 493 (2010)
(“[O]ne who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to
maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.” (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935))).
108. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2).
109. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) (“That the combination of investigative and
adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation, does not, of
course, preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the
case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high.”).
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manipulate factual findings to reach the agency’s policy objectives.110
Finally, the APA limits ALJs’ ex parte communications with those
inside (to some extent) and outside of the agency.111 The D.C. Circuit
has indicated that ex parte communications as part of adjudication can
present due process concerns.112
2.

Delegation of Authority to Craft Procedure

Outside of the APA’s requirements, such as with “informal
adjudication,” Congress has largely delegated the creation of optimal
process to agencies by giving them the authority to provide process
beyond the APA’s requirements.113 The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that courts have an extremely limited place in requiring
agencies to provide process beyond any statutory requirement.114
Agencies have the substantive expertise, and thus the institutional
advantage, in determining which processes are worth the costs.115 States
often provide state agencies similar or even greater flexibility.116
Moreover, due to doctrinal changes in recent decades, agencies have
gained more delegated space. The APA drafters in 1946 thought that the
APA provisions for formal adjudication would apply to nearly all
evidentiary or adversarial hearings.117 Yet, agencies obtained
significantly more discretion to choose whether to use ALJs or non-ALJs
after the Court’s well-known 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, Inc.118 That decision permits agencies to resolve ambiguous
110. See Gifford, supra note 26, at 6–8.
111. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d)(1).
112. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Fed.
Maritime Comm’n, 584 F.2d 519, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“The inconsistency of secret ex parte
contacts with the notion of a fair hearing and with the principles of fairness implicit in due process
has long been recognized.”); Appeal of Pub. Serv. Co., 454 A.2d 435, 441–43 (N.H. 1982) (holding
that even in the absence of procedures by the legislature, due process requires commission members
to refrain from ex parte communications when they act in an adjudicative capacity).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 559.
114. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 523 (1978) (stating that “such
circumstances [i.e., when courts may appropriately require agencies to impose procedures beyond
statutory requirements], if they exist, are extremely rare”).
115. See Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1895, 1920–
21 (2016).
116. See Bonfield, supra note 79, at 313 (discussing how the 1981 Model State Administrative
Procedure Act permits agencies to grant additional procedural rights, as long as other parties are not
substantially prejudiced, and to use a mix of rulemaking and adjudication as part of the same
decisionmaking proceeding).
117. See supra notes 91–92.
118. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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language in statutes that they administer,119 including whether the statute
requires “on the record” hearings.120 With this discretion in hand,
agencies have turned to non-ALJ adjudication en masse.121
As agencies go about fashioning adjudication and adjudicators,
systems design—including adjudicatory or rulemaking procedure and
impartiality protections—can promote or hinder over-enforcement.122
Sometimes bureaucracies have incentives to provide more process than
due process or the APA requires. For example, process can further
agency missions by promoting accurate decisionmaking, which achieves
objectives in a more efficient manner than an error-ridden process.123
Agencies may also permit additional process to satisfy particular
stakeholders.124 For example, the SEC recently provided regulated
parties significantly more discovery rights in formal adjudication than
the APA requires after regulated parties in enforcement proceedings
expressed significant fairness concerns.125 Agencies, too, may adopt
additional procedures to render administrative and judicial review more
efficient.126
But agencies, as agents of Congress and the President, may have an
interest in achieving certain policy goals to please those who comprise
the agency, their different overseers (the President, the current Congress,
and congressional committees), or interest groups. Agencies may view
their missions as tilting towards certain outcomes to please any or all of
these groups, despite contrary statutory design or fairness concerns.
119. See id. at 842–43.
120. See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 13–14, 17–18 (1st Cir.
2006) (recognizing that Chevron requires courts, contrary to earlier practice, to defer to agencies’
reasonable interpretation of their statutes as to whether hearings must be “on the record”). The
Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that retains a presumption in favor of formal adjudication when the
statute requires a hearing. See JOHN M. ROGERS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 122 (3d ed. 2012).
121. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1662–66.
122. See Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129,
1143–50 (2016) (considering how systems design affects over- or under-enforcement, especially in
context of criminal and immigration enforcement, and how the APA has attempted to address some
of these issues by using impartial ALJs).
123. See Vermeule, supra note 115, at 1905.
124. See id. at 1925.
125. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Governing Administrative Proceedings
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-209.html [https://perma.cc/CNA3L3AM]. The final rule is available at SEC, AMENDMENTS TO THE COMMISSION’S RULES OF PRACTICE
(2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf [https://perma.cc/798S-TUR7].
126. See Vermeule, supra note 115, at 1905. Notably, if an agency has not assembled an
administrative record or explained its decision before judicial review, courts can require agencies to
assemble an administrative record and compel agency officials to testify concerning their decisions.
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
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Take two examples, including one in the introduction. The Trump
Administration has made it clear that it wants to limit legal and illegal
immigration, including asylum claims. Former Attorney General Jeff
Sessions first did so by issuing a decision that limited the grounds upon
which an asylum applicant could obtain relief.127 He then went further in
seeking to alter how immigration judges are evaluated—by assessing
their case-processing speed and their reversal rates by the department or
federal courts.128 Negative evaluations could lead to discipline or
removal.129 As another example, the Obama Administration’s
Department of Education issued a controversial “Dear Colleague” letter
to schools that receive federal funding that called for certain procedural
requirements in sexual-harassment or sexual-assault hearings.130 Some
questioned whether the agency was designing a system for overenforcement of certain statutory mandates at the expense of accused
individuals’ due process rights.131
Because agencies’ preferences may diverge from those of the
Congress that enacted the regulatory framework and because agencies
can use systems design to further their preferences, procedural
delegation presents a classic case of Congress incurring principal-agency
costs in needing to oversee a potentially disloyal or errant agent.132
Agency procedures, given their number and oblique effect on
substantive outcomes, often lack salience, rendering oversight difficultto-impossible. And agencies’ use of internal guidance and even custom
to establish procedural norms can impede transparency for even the
vigilant overseer. In short, Congress must have accessible information to
monitor agencies.
Even absent preference divergence, agencies may have
epistemological problems in designing optimal procedure. Depending on
127. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (limiting grounds upon which victims of
private criminal activity can seek asylum).
128. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
129. See id.
130. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ. (Apr. 4, 2011),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9CB-EV77].
131. See, e.g., Matthew R. Triplett, Note, Sexual Assault on College Campuses: Seeking the
Appropriate Balance Between Due Process and Victim Protection, 62 DUKE L.J. 487, 489 n.9
(2012) (collecting sources). Perhaps some procedure, such as ample reason-giving requirements,
can reveal faulty agency motivations or decisionmaking, but it is hardly a panacea. See Vermeule,
supra note 115, at 1928. After all, reason giving can only do so much when, as with many
immigration and sexual-assault hearings, the decision maker’s findings on credibility are often
determinative and difficult to review.
132. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18
(1982).
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the frequency of agencies’ use of adjudication and their officials’
familiarity with designing procedure, agency officials may have little
expertise in designing process, even if they are experts in the underlying
substantive area. Indeed, their substantive expertise may lead them to
conclude, incorrectly, that they are also procedural experts.133 The same
problems with procedure’s salience and transparency that hobbles
congressional oversight also inhibits agencies, whether creating or
improving procedural design, from easily learning about other agencies’
procedural schema. Likewise, the hidden nature of procedural schema
renders it more difficult for outside groups—whether affected interest
groups, academics, or good-government watchdogs—to identify
problems and propose improvements.
II.

IMPARTIALITY PROTECTIONS FOR NON-ALJS

Outside of the APA’s relatively generous process for on-the-record
adjudications, agency adjudication is varied and, because of its
seemingly endless variety, easy to ignore. This Part seeks to focus
attention on non-ALJs’ impartiality. The empirical data presented here
confirm that agencies have provided neither uniform nor optimal
impartiality protections, as measured by ALJs’ protections, to non-ALJs.
A.

Optimal Impartiality for Non-ALJ Hearings

As indicated in Section I.A, identifying optimal process is frequently
difficult because of problems measuring the costs and benefits of process
and because of the necessity in recalibrating process over time. But the
APA provides a useful guide for optimal impartiality protections
because its provisions track many due process considerations in the
administrative adjudicatory context.134
These provisions are optimal beyond ALJ proceedings. As noted
earlier, the APA drafters thought that the APA provisions for formal
adjudication would apply to most all evidentiary or adversarial hearings,
but case law has given agencies more discretion in fashioning their

133. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 49, at 560 (“[E]xperts may myopically focus on issues
within their area of expertise and thereby fail to recognize that a decision would benefit from
accessing other bodies of knowledge or ways of thinking.”).
134. The APA also provides guidance on optimal process concerning the hearings themselves,
which agencies have largely incorporated into many “informal” adjudications. I focus here on the
APA impartiality protections, which agencies have treated much more divergently. See infra note
139 and accompanying text.

04 - Barnett (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

6/18/2019 7:57 PM

538

[Vol. 94:515

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

hearings.135 As I have argued elsewhere, agencies have chosen non-ALJs
largely to have more control over them and their hiring.136 But, notably,
the growing adoption of non-ALJs does not indicate that the APA’s
impartiality protections for ALJs are suboptimal or that Congress
intended to deviate from the APA model. ACUS (in consultation with
working groups comprised of agency officials and outside
administrative-law lawyers) has applied many of them in its Model
Adjudication Rules, which are intended to apply to both formal and
informal agency hearings.137 And ACUS has suggested best practices for
a large subset of non-ALJ hearings that largely mirror practices in ALJ
hearings.138 Accordingly, even if these impartiality factors need some
tweaking, they provide a useful, well-known, and oft-used guide for
assessing non-ALJ hearings.
B.

Empirical Data on Non-ALJ Hearings and Impartiality

The findings discussed in this Section are limited to data regarding
informal adjudications that permit oral evidentiary hearings. The process
during the hearings (pleadings, burdens of proof, discovery, crossexamination, reasoned decision) has come to resemble formal
adjudication.139 The important difference between these kinds of
proceedings is the presiding official. In the hearings that are the subject
of this study, non-ALJ adjudicators preside.
To gather more data on non-ALJ proceedings and especially non-ALJ
impartiality, the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal
System and I recently administered a government-wide survey to
agencies as academic consultants for ACUS, the independent federal
135. See supra notes 117–120 and accompanying text.
136. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1667–71. The Social Security Administration had expressed
its displeasure at OPM’s hiring process and refusal to engage in ALJ hiring more frequently. See
generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-14, RESULTS ORIENTED CULTURES:
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SHOULD REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE PROGRAM
TO IMPROVE HIRING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT (2010).
137. See MODEL ADJUDICATION RULE 100(A) (ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. 2018) (defining
“adjudication” to include hearings over which ALJs and others preside). The MARs do not address
appointment, which would require congressional action if all adjudicators were selected like ALJs
under the auspices of OPM.
138. See ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 2016-4: EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS NOT
REQUIRED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 2–9 (2016) (recommending practices
concerning adjudicator impartiality and hearing process for “Type B” adjudicatory hearings, which
are those required hearings to which the APA does not apply, over which ALJs do not preside, and
which must have an exclusive record).
139. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1698–99. A 1992 ACUS report noted that informal hearings
“contain most of the ingredients of an APA formal hearing.” Verkuil et al., supra note 94, at 1053–54.

04 - Barnett (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

SOME KIND OF HEARING OFFICER

6/18/2019 7:57 PM

539

agency charged with providing research and recommendations on
improving the federal administrative state.140 With ACUS’s unparalleled
access to federal agencies, we were able to report findings on the current
state of the impartiality protections that agencies have provided nonALJs (or the lack thereof). These findings served as the basis of our
report to ACUS, which ACUS has transmitted to federal agencies. That
report provided our full findings and guidance on how agencies should
fashion impartiality protections. This Part, relying on the report and
recommendations to ACUS, summarizes our research design and the
portion of our findings that are germane to my disclosure proposal in
Part III.
Because of the variety of agency adjudications, it is frequently
difficult to identify and define various terms related to non-ALJ
hearings. Moreover, including complicated, nuanced definitions could
have dissuaded agencies from completing the survey. Thus, we provided
as descriptive a definition as we thought prudent to capture the kinds of
non-ALJ hearings that we sought to consider (referred to as “oral
hearings” in the survey itself and as “non-ALJ hearings” in this Article):
One of the parties to the adjudication can—by statute,
regulation, or other law—obtain an oral hearing over which an
agency official presides to present evidence, even if most
matters are handled through written submissions without an oral
hearing, and the presiding agency official is not a member or
commissioner of the agency, and is not an “Administrative Law
Judge.” Instead, the agency official goes by another title, such as
Administrative Judge, Administrative Appeals Judge,
Administrative Patent Judge, Board of Contract Appeals Judge,
Veterans Law Judge, Immigration Judge, Presiding Officer,
Hearing Officer, etc. The relevant “oral hearings” do not include
“public hearings” in which members of the public are invited to
make statements or an initial “front-line” agency decision when
that initial decision is followed by an evidentiary hearing before
an agency or court.141
We sent a detailed survey to 64 federal departments, agencies, or
subcomponents within them.142 We received 61 responses from 53
140. See generally BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77.
141. See id. at 13. Notably, initial decisions from an agency that include the right to an oral
hearing would not qualify under our definition as “front-line” determinations.
142. See id. at app. A. For comparison’s sake, Raymond Limon (head of the now-defunct OPM
Office of ALJs) surveyed 80 agencies in 2002, and former ALJ John Frye surveyed 48 agencies in
1992. Compare RAYMOND LIMON, OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW JUDGES, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY: THEN AND NOW—A DECADE OF CHANGE 1992–2002, at 2 (2002)
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entities, whether identified as an “agency” or at least one subcomponent
within a larger entity.143 One agency, accordingly, may have had more
than one subcomponent respond. Based on replies from 53 of the 64
federal entities to which we sent surveys, we had a response rate of
82.8%.144 While 31 agencies or their subcomponents reported that they
do not conduct non-ALJ hearings, the analyses that follow are based on
responses (which we did not independently confirm) from 30 agencies or
their subcomponents that conduct non-ALJ hearings.145 For ease of
reference, I shall refer to all responding entities as “agencies.”
Agencies reported having 47 different kinds of non-ALJ hearings, 15
of which may consist of only appellate non-ALJ hearings. These 47
types fell into the following categories (with some kinds of hearings
fitting into more than one category): government benefits (11),
enforcement (10), disputes between private parties (9), federal
employment disputes (6), miscellaneous/other (6), licensing (5),
government contracts (4), and disputes between different governmental
agencies (0). No category commanded even 25% of the reported hearing

(“[W]e eventually contacted over 80 Federal agencies and offices . . . .”), with John H. Frye III,
Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, app. A
(1992) (listing agencies to which surveys were sent). Depending on how one counts, there are
approximately 110 federal agencies. See ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., SOURCEBOOK OF THE UNITED
STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, app. A-1 (2012) (listing agencies). But many of those are highly
unlikely to have relevant hearings because of their narrow missions. With guidance from ACUS, the
entity that has created the most comprehensive listing of agencies, we created a list of all agencies
that, in our judgment, we thought were likely to have relevant hearings.
143. See BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, app. B (listing which agencies did and did not respond
to our surveys and listing whether a responding agency reported having “non-ALJ hearings”). 65
agencies responded to the Limon Study and 47 responded to the Frye Study. Compare LIMON,
supra note 142, app. C, with Frye, supra note 142, app. A.
144. The agencies that did not respond include the Board for Correction for Military Records (for
the Air Force), Board of Correction of Military Records (for the Army), the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, the Office of Hearings and Appeals and the
Legal Services Office for Civilian Health within the Department of Defense, the Food and Drug
Administration within the Department of Health and Human Sciences, Citizenship-Immigration
Services within the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Administration Agency, the
Office of Hearings and Appeals within the Department of Interior, the Federal Housing
Administration within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Board of
Immigration Appeals within the Department of Justice, the Department of the Navy, the Department
of Transportation, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the National Endowment for the Arts, the
National Science Foundation, the SEC, and the Small Business Administration. See BARNETT ET
AL., supra note 77, app. B.
145. See id. at app. B (listing agencies that responded to our survey and listing the responding
agencies that reported providing “non-ALJ hearings”); id. at app. C (listing the reported kinds of
non-ALJ hearings and types of non-ALJs).
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types, revealing the variety of non-ALJ hearings across the federal
government.146
Figure 1:
Types of Non-ALJ Hearings (n=47)

TYPES OF NON-ALJ
HEARINGS

Government contracts

4

Licensing

5

Miscellaneous/other

6

Federal employment disputes

6

Disputes between private parties

9

Enforcement

10

Government benefits

11
0

5

10

15

Aside from reporting kinds of hearings, agencies also reported
different types of non-ALJs. Non-ALJs significantly outnumber ALJs.
The federal government has 1,931 ALJs147 and, as Table 1 indicates, at
least 10,831 non-ALJ presiding officials, meaning that there are
approximately five times as many non-ALJs as ALJs. Only 39 of the
10,831 non-ALJs are part-time agency employees.

146. Unlike earlier studies, we did not collect responses concerning the caseloads for different
non-ALJ hearings because our study focuses more on the non-ALJs themselves and because of what
we perceived as the difficulty in obtaining reliable data from agencies. See Frye, supra note 142, at
264 (reporting estimated caseloads and noting lack of consistent agency reporting).
147. See supra note 24.
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Table 1:
Number of Reported Non-ALJs

Agency

Subcomponent

Administrative
Office of the U.S.
Courts
Commodity
Futures Trading
Commission
(CFTC)
U.S. Department
of Agriculture
(USDA)
Department of
Commerce

Fair Employment
Practices Office

Department of
Defense (DOD)
Department of
Education (DOE)
Department of
Health and Human
Services (HHS)
Department of
Homeland
Security (DHS)
Department of
Justice (DOJ)
Department of
Labor (DOL)
Department of
Treasury
Veterans Affairs
(VA)

Fulltime

Part-time
1

Office of Proceedings

15

Agricultural Marketing
Service, Specialty Crops
Program
Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (PTAB)
U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO)
Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals
Office of Hearings and
Appeals
Office of Secretary,
Departmental Appeals
Board
Coast Guard

3

Executive Office for
Immigration Review
(EOIR)
Benefits Review Board
(BRB)
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax
and Trade Bureau
Internal Review Service
(IRS)

326

265

10

7856
22
2
5
3

5
Contract
714
630
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Agency
Equal Employment
Opportunity
Commission
(EEOC)
Environmental
Protection Agency
(EPA)
Federal Deposit
Insurance
Corporation
(FDIC)
Federal Maritime
Commission
(FMC)
Federal Labor
Relations
Authority (FLRA)
Government
Accountability
Office (GAO)
Library of
Congress
Merit Systems
Protection Board
(MSPB)
National
Aeronautics and
Space
Administration
(NASA)
National Labor
Relations Board
(NLRB)
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
(NRC)
Peace Corps
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Subcomponent

Regional Offices
Office of Administration
& Resources

Fulltime
87

543
Part-time
5

10
2
Ad hoc

2148
Office of General Counsel

40
43

2

3
68

2

1

600
11

19

6

148. The official who responded for the FMC reported that one non-ALJ is appointed as necessary.
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Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp.
(PBGC)
Railroad
Retirement Bd.
(RRB)
Social Security
Administration
(SSA)
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Subcomponent

Fulltime
6

Bureau of Hearings and
Appeals

6

Office of Appellate
Operations

61

Part-time

10,792
39
10,831
(Total Reported
Non-ALJs)
Of note, nearly 7,900 of the reported approximately 10,800 non-ALJs
are patent examiners for PTO.149 To provide more useful reporting of the
data and to limit the large number of patent examiners from obfuscating
our findings, I often discuss the data in terms of the number of non-ALJ
types, as opposed to the total number of non-ALJs. Moreover, one
should be cautious in placing too much importance on any particular
non-ALJ type. Some types, despite being able to preside over our
relevant oral hearings, may only do so occasionally.150
The more than 10,000 non-ALJs go by numerous titles, including
Administrative Appeals Judge (and similar variations), Administrative
Judge, Attorney-Examiner, Copyright Royalty Judge, Hearing Officer,
Immigration Judge, Judgment Officer, Patent Examiner, Presiding
Officer, Regional Director, Regional Judicial Officer, and Settlement
Officer. Of these, 964 have the word “judge” in their titles.
Most importantly for our research, we sought information from
agencies about the impartiality of their non-ALJs. In particular, we were
curious whether agencies gave non-ALJs similar impartiality protections
that ALJs have by statute. As indicated below, agencies have nothing
near a uniform approach.
149. As we discussed in our report, PTO expanded their patent-examiner ranks significantly since
2000. See BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, at 19–20.
150. To mitigate the concern that impartiality protections may be impracticable for agency
officials who rarely preside over hearings, our report recommended that, whenever possible,
agencies should consolidate hearing-officer duties in as few officials as possible. See id. at 64.
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Hiring Requirements

Before President Trump’s Executive Order on ALJ hiring, OPM
required that ALJs meet certain requirements. They must have been
licensed lawyers with at least seven years litigation or administrativelaw practice.151 They must have participated in hearings at least as
formal as those over which ALJs preside under the APA.152 Finally, they
must have passed an examination that considers skills, such as writing
ability, that are relevant to adjudicatory duties.153 To agencies’ vocalized
chagrin, OPM did not consider subject-matter expertise.154 Under the
new process, agencies themselves can set the qualifications for their ALJ
candidates, save that the candidate must have a law license.155
As has proven incredibly timely in light of the changes to ALJ hiring,
we asked agencies about their hiring qualifications for non-ALJs.156
Agencies reported that 31 of the 37 reported non-ALJ types must meet
minimum qualifications. We asked about qualifications for (1) outside
candidates whom agencies consider hiring initially as non-ALJs, and
(2) agency employees whom agencies move from another position
within the agency to serve as non-ALJs. Of the 31 non-ALJ types for
which agencies responded with qualifications information, 23 of those
types are hired both initially from outside the agency and from within,
while four are hired only from within and four are hired only from
outside.157
151. See Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, OPM,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-qualifications/general-schedule-qualificationstandards/specialty-areas/administrative-law-judge-positions/ [https://perma.cc/D4FS-8WP7].
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1704. Despite heavy and longstanding criticism, OPM also
provided veterans and disabled veterans a significant preference in the scoring of candidates. See
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33
ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 115–16 (1981). The preference, as a practical matter, moved veterans to the
top of the potential candidates list and limits gender diversity. Id.
155. See Exec. Order, supra note 30, § 3.
156. We did not ask agencies about the hiring process. After consultation with ACUS staff, we
concluded that hiring practices are so disparate that attempting to glean useful responses would
require narrative answers, which would hinder our ability to compare hiring practices. A better
research model for hiring practices would likely be an interview method.
157. Agencies did not report any minimum qualifications for six of the non-ALJ types. Most of
those agencies—such as the Administrative Office of the Courts or the Treasury (for Labor
Arbitrators), the FDIC, or the Peace Corps—likely did not report any information because of the
short-term contractual (or temporary and rare) nature of the individual’s adjudication duties. These
agencies likely do not have formalized requirements. The responding official for the FMC’s two
types of non-ALJs did not know of any qualifications.
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Agencies reported hiring agency employees initially for of the
reported 37 non-ALJ types. We specifically asked agencies about certain
potential qualifications and asked them to mark all qualifications that
applied. We asked for them, if applicable, to identify other
qualifications. As indicated in Figure , they reported the following
minimum qualifications for initial hires:
Figure 2:
Minimum Qualifications (Initial Hires) (n=27)
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Agencies require that nearly two-thirds of the 27 initially-hired nonALJ types (63%) have law degrees,158 and some impose related
requirements, such as expertise in general administrative law (CFTC),
bar membership (EEOC), a mix of litigation and/or subject-matter
expertise (EPA and Library of Congress), and dispute-resolution
experience (NASA). Applicants could meet agencies’ years-of-legalpractice requirements with between five and ten years of experience.
Only two other qualifications were common to more than one-third of
the types: consideration of demeanor and references. Agencies reported
“other” qualifications, such as scientific degrees (PTO) and certain
military rank (U.S. Coast Guard).
Perhaps the most interesting takeaway is that agencies reported only
considering subject-matter expertise when initially hiring non-ALJs for
eight non-ALJ types (or 12 types, if including an expansive
158. The NLRB noted that it hires some hearing officers with a law degree and others without.
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understanding of the qualifications with the “other” answers)—not even
half of the 27 types initially hired. Before the recent changes to ALJ
hiring, agencies had often lamented OPM’s refusal to consider subjectmatter expertise for ALJs,159 but our findings suggest that agencies
themselves do not usually consider such expertise. That said, agencies
consider, without exception, expertise for scientific areas.160
Agencies reported moving existing employees into non-ALJ roles for,
coincidentally, 27 non-ALJ types, too (and thus indicating that some
agencies select non-ALJs from inside and outside of the agency). Similar
to initial hires, agencies require a law degree for 59% of the non-ALJ
types hired from within the agency. And agencies that require years of
legal practice impose from seven to ten years of experience.
Interestingly, as indicated in Figure , agencies reported more types of
minimum qualifications for internal hires. With these internal hires,
agencies were more likely than with outside hires to consider subjectmatter expertise, writing ability, demeanor, and—perhaps most
surprising—references. Agencies reported similar qualifications under
“other” as they did for initial hires.
Figure 3:
Minimum Qualifications (Existing Employees) (n=27)

15

14

12

10

7

5
Yrs. of gov’t
serv.
Yrs. of leg. prac.
in area

Yrs. of leg. prac.

Written
exam/review

References

Sub. matter
expertise

1

159. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1704.
160. PTO and NRC reported requiring expertise or scientific degrees.
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Separation of Functions

To protect ALJs’ independence in proceedings in which the agency is
often a party, ALJs are prohibited under the APA from performing
investigative or prosecutorial functions or reporting to one with those
functions and can only engage in adjudicatory functions.161
Figure reports our results. Agencies indicated that 16 (or 43.2%) of
the 37 non-ALJ types—our largest group—had no required separation of
functions. Three types worked for agencies that only adjudicate and thus
have no functions to separate. Three types could perform only
adjudicative duties and thus had complete separation of functions, like
ALJs. For the remaining 15 non-ALJ types, 8 were prohibited from
engaging in investigative or prosecutorial functions, but they could
engage in other kinds of agency functions. The remaining types reported
“other” limits. For instance, Treasury’s Settlement Officers cannot
prosecute or investigate the cases that they decided, Copyright Royalty
Judges are limited by general ethics and conflicts rules, and Presiding
Officers for the CFTC cannot report to an employee who prosecutes or
investigates.
Figure 4:
Required Separation of Functions (n=37)

REQUIRED SEPARATION
OF FUNCTIONS?
Yes,
Other
Limits
7

N…
No
16

Yes, Can't
Prosecute
Yes,
8

Complete

3

The lack of separation of functions may be more troubling in certain
kinds of hearings, such as those in which the agency is a party and
161. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(2), 3105 (2018).

04 - Barnett (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

SOME KIND OF HEARING OFFICER

6/18/2019 7:57 PM

549

enforcement proceedings, where the agency is particularly interested in
the outcome of the proceeding. For non-ALJ types that preside over
hearings in which their agencies are parties, they have no separation of
functions more than one-third of the time (35.3%). The same percentage
(35.3%) of those non-ALJ types that preside over hearings in which the
agency is a party are prohibited from performing investigative or
prosecutorial functions. The remaining non-ALJ types either need no
separation of functions because the agency has no other functions
(5.9%), are prohibited from performing any function other than
adjudication (11.8%), or have some other limitation (11.8%). Agencies
appear more sensitive to the need for separation of functions in
enforcement proceedings specifically.
3.

Ex Parte Communications

Several APA provisions prohibit various kinds of ex parte
communications with ALJs. ALJs may generally not have ex parte
communications concerning facts at issue with anyone, but ALJs may
discuss legal issues with others inside the agency, except employees who
investigate or prosecute the case at issue or one factually related.162 The
members of the agency, ALJs, and other employees reasonably expected
to participate in the decisional process may not have ex parte
communications with “interested person[s] outside the agency”
concerning legal or factual issues in dispute.163 But they can discuss
these issues with those inside the agency.164
Figure indicates that 21 of the 37 non-ALJ types (56.8%) reported
that all ex parte communications are prohibited, 5 (13.5%) reported no
ex parte communications are prohibited, and 11 (29.7%) reported that
some ex parte communications are prohibited. Notably, the prohibition
on all ex parte communications (as to both matters of fact and law) is
stricter than even the APA standard for ALJs because the prohibition for
non-ALJs extends to more than factual matters.165 This stricter
prohibition is consistent with ACUS’s Model Adjudication Rule on
prohibiting ex parte communications.166

162. Id. § 554(d).
163. Id. § 557(d)(1).
164. Id.
165. Id. § 554(d)(2).
166. See MODEL ADJUDICATION RULE 120(A) (ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 2018)
(“Except as required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law, the Adjudicator may
not consult a person or party on any matter relevant to the merits of the adjudication . . . .”).
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Figure 5:
Prohibitions on Ex Parte Communications (n=37)

PROHIBITIONS ON EX PARTE
COMMUNICATIONS

None
Prohibited
29.7%
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Some
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As indicated in Figure , agencies identified the sources of these
prohibitions on ex parte communications—whether in statute,
substantive rule (such as a notice-and-comment rule), procedural rule,
internal agency guidance, or custom—for 12 non-ALJ types (with some
having more than one source).
Figure 6:
Sources of Limitations on Ex Parte Communications (n=12)

SOURCE OF LIMITS ON
EX PARTE
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Notably, 76.2% of the agencies that answered this question indicated
that the prohibitions come in the least accessible and transparent
formats: internal guidance and custom. Agencies’ substantial reliance on
custom is problematic because it is likely to be unwritten, opaque, and
construed differently by individual non-ALJs.
4.

Physical Separation

Relatedly, physical separation between adjudicators and other agency
officials can help provide actual and psychological distance. It can lead
to fewer causal interactions between the adjudicators and the other staff
and bolster the impression of adjudicators’ independence. Nearly forty
years ago, Professor Paul Verkuil reported that the Department of
Interior’s physical separation and new titles for its non-ALJs led some to
assert that the “resulting decisions on informal appeals are less
intuitionally oriented, more objective and ultimately more fair.”167 He
lauded the agency for its “internal agency reform that . . . substantially
increased the impartiality of informal decision making at a low cost to
the system.”168
Figure indicates our results concerning physical separation for nonALJs across the administrative state. Of the 37 non-ALJ types, only
approximately half (18 of 37) are physically separated. One type
(Hearing Officers for the FMC) is sometimes physically separated, while
the remaining 18 types are not. The most troubling finding is that nonALJs in enforcement and government-contract proceedings are not
always physically separated, despite the government’s heightened
interest in these matters.169

167. Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 787
(1976).
168. Id.
169. Similarly, agencies reported that 47.1% of the non-ALJ types who hear matters in which the
non-ALJs’ agency is a party (regardless of the nature of the hearing) is physically separated, and the
same percentage is not physically separated. One type (or approximately 5.9%) is sometimes
physically separated.
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Figure 7:
Physical Separation (n=37)
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Performance Appraisals and Bonus Eligibility

To increase ALJ independence from their agencies, ALJs are exempt
from civil-service performance reviews and cannot receive bonuses from
their agencies.170 We sought to ascertain whether non-ALJs had similar
protections from agency oversight.
First, we asked agencies whether the 37 types of non-ALJs were
subject to performance reviews. If so, we asked about the nature of those
reviews. Second, we asked whether the agency awarded bonuses to nonALJs. Finally, we asked whether the agency had set up any means of
preventing the reviews from impacting the non-ALJs’ impartiality.
A large proportion of non-ALJs by type and an even larger proportion
by number are subject to performance reviews. Of the 37 types of nonALJs, 28 (or approximately 76%) are subject to performance reviews
(Figure ).171 Of the 10,831 total non-ALJs, all but 68 are subject to
performance reviews.172 Thus, an overwhelming 99.3% of all non-ALJs
are subject to performance reviews (
170. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1655–56.
171. The nine non-ALJ types without performance reviews were the Administrative Office of the
Courts, DOD, Treasury (Labor Arbitrators), FDIC, GAO (five Personnel Appeals Board Members),
the Library of Congress, NASA, NRC, and the Peace Corps.
172. The number is so high because the more than 7,500 PTO adjudicators are subject to
performance reviews. The agencies and the number of non-ALJs not subject to performance reviews
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Figure 9). Of the 10 agencies, not including the Department of
Commerce, with more than 25 non-ALJs (see Table 1), 9 of them have
performance reviews for their non-ALJs.
Figure 8:
Types Subject to Performance Reviews (n=37)

NON-ALJ TYPES SUBJECT TO
PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS?
No (9)
24.3%
Yes (28)
75.7%

are as follows: Administrative Office of the Courts (1), DOD (22), GAO (5 Personnel Appeals
Board Members), the Library of Congress (3), NASA (1), NRC (30), and the Peace Corps (6). The
FDIC and Treasury Labor Arbitrators are hired only on an ad hoc basis.
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Figure 9:
Number of ALJs & Performance Reviews (n=10,831)

NUMBER OF ALJS SUBJECT TO
PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS?
(68)
0.6%

(10,763)
99.4%

Subject

Not Subject

As with several other factors that concern non-ALJ independence, we
considered how frequently agencies conducted performance appraisals
for non-ALJ types who preside over hearings in which the agency is a
party. The appraisals could serve as a subtle (or not-so-subtle) method of
influencing non-ALJ decisionmaking. Given the significant percentage
of non-ALJ types and total number of non-ALJs who are subject to
performance appraisals, we were not surprised to find that agencies
conduct appraisals on 70.6% of non-ALJ types that hear proceedings in
which agencies are a party (and for 89% of non-ALJ types that hear
enforcement matters).173 This percentage, slightly smaller than the
overall percentage of non-ALJ types subject to appraisals (75.7%),
suggests some agency sensitivity to non-ALJ hearings in which the
agency is a party. But the percentage is still substantial and indicates that
agencies are using a suspect tool that may impugn non-ALJ
independence in the proceedings where it is most sensitive.
To understand the nature of the non-ALJs’ performance appraisals,
we asked agencies to identify whether the appraisals included
consideration of (1) case-processing goals, (2) input from litigants,
(3) peer review, (4) review of the non-ALJs’ decisions themselves,
173. The use of performance appraisals for different kinds of non-ALJ hearings was fairly
consistent. Agencies conduct appraisals for 100% of non-ALJ types that hear benefits matters,
76.9% for federal employment disputes, 75.0% for licensing and for disputes between private
parties, 71.4% for enforcement, and 66.7% for government contracts.
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(5) reversal rates of the non-ALJs’ decisions, or (6) other factors. We
asked them to identify all that apply, and agencies reported information
on the performance appraisals for 26 of the 28 non-ALJ types that are
subject to performance appraisals.174
Figure 10:
Nature of Performance Appraisals (n=26)
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APPRAISALS
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As Figure 10 indicates, the two most popular factors in non-ALJs’
performance appraisals are case-processing goals (for 80.8% of non-ALJ
types for which we received responses) and review of non-ALJs’
decisions (69.2%). Litigant input, peer review, and reversal rates are
relatively rare.
The 11 “other” responses provided more, and sometimes concerning,
detail. For example, agencies for certain non-ALJ types—such as the
Department of Education’s AJs and HHS’s Departmental Appeals Board
Members—also consider administrative responsibilities. The Coast
Guard considers the non-ALJ’s adherence to agency guidance on
“impartiality, fairness, and achieving the remedial goals of the civilpenalty process.” Other agencies, such as the VA, echoed the Coast
Guard by indicating that they consider compliance with statutes and
regulations or “job knowledge.” The MSPB considered “government-

174. The FMC did not report information for its two non-ALJ types.
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wide performance standards.” SSA and Treasury reported considering
vague (and potentially troubling) “business results.”175
Unlike the uniform prohibition against agencies paying bonuses to
their ALJs, agencies can generally pay their non-ALJs bonuses. We
sought to determine how widespread the paying of bonuses was to nonALJs, and the size of these bonuses. Of the 28 non-ALJ types that are
subject to performance appraisals, as Figure
indicates, 20 (or
approximately 71.4%) of them are eligible for bonuses (and the
responding official for two non-ALJ types for the FMC was unsure). Of
the 10,831 reported non-ALJs, 9,799 (or approximately 90%) are
eligible for bonuses (see
Figure ).176 Of those types, all received bonuses last year (even if not
every non-ALJ within a type received a bonus).

175. “Business results” is a vague phrase. Whose business does the criterion concern? If it is the
Treasury’s business, what are the results that it seeks to obtain from the adjudications? If the agency
seeks revenue generation, this would appear to reward adjudicators who favor the agency’s
preferred outcome. Regardless of the phrase’s exact meaning, the lack of clarity does not provide
helpful guidance to adjudicators or the public on the relevant criteria for non-ALJs’ performance
evaluation.
176. The following non-ALJs are eligible for bonuses (totaling 9,799): CFTC (15), PTAB (275),
PTO (7,856), DOE (2), HHS (5), DOL/BRB (5), Treasury (714), EEOC (92), EPA (12), FLRA (40),
FAO (40 Senior Attorneys), MSPB (70), NLRB (600), PBGC (6), RRB (6), and SSA (61). The
largest groups of non-ALJs who are not eligible for bonuses are those that work for the VA (630)
and DOJ/EOIR (326).
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Figure 11:
Bonus Eligibility, by Types of Non-ALJs Subject to Performance
Appraisals (n=28)
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Figure 12:
Bonus Eligibility, by Number of Non-ALJs (n=10,831)
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Of the 17 non-ALJ types who preside over matters in which their
agencies are parties, more than 70% of those types are subject to
performance appraisals, and 58.8% of them are eligible for bonuses.
Although not all of the non-ALJ types who preside over matters in
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which their agencies are parties may receive bonuses, a majority of them
have annual performance appraisals that can affect their income.
In response to our question asking how many non-ALJs received
bonuses, some of the agencies reported how many non-ALJs within each
type received bonuses in 2016. Figure indicates the percentage of nonALJs who received bonuses for each of the 15 types that reported the
information:
Figure 13:
Percentage of Non-ALJs Who Received Bonuses in 2017 (n=15)

PERCENT OF NON-ALJS
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We concluded our inquiry on performance appraisals and bonuses by
asking whether agencies that used performance appraisals took
precautions to ensure that the appraisals did not interfere with non-ALJs’
impartiality. Contrary to the bonus ranges, we were able to categorize
agency efforts to mitigate performance appraisals’ effects on
impartiality. We categorized the reported precautions in Figure as
(1) ignoring case outcomes, (2) crafting review standards or scoring to
protect impartiality (likely very similar to “ignoring case outcomes”),
(3) using some form of separation of functions and reporting
relationships to insulate non-ALJs, and (4) relying upon conflict-ofinterest principles.
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Figure 14:
Nature of Precautions, Categorized (n=17)
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CATEGORIZED
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As indicated, approximately half of the reported precautions preclude
consideration of case outcomes in performance appraisals, while
approximately 35% consider the standards or scoring to limit discretion.
Only one non-ALJ type has separation-of-functions-based protections,
and only one has conflicts-of-interest principles to mitigate concerns.
6.

For-Cause Removal

Agencies can remove ALJs for only “good cause established and
determined by the [MSPB]” after a formal administrative hearing.177
This limit on agencies’ ability to remove ALJs seeks to promote their
impartiality. As the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stated in the
context of the president’s and principal officers’ power to remove other
officials, “one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another,
cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence
against the latter’s will.”178 Although we were aware of a handful of
non-ALJs with similar protection from at-will removal,179 we surveyed
agencies to see if other non-ALJs had similar protections, whether
177. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018).
178. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (quoting
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
179. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1648 n.21 (discussing protections for certain Board of
Contracts Appeals Judges).
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pursuant to statute, regulation, or other source of law. Agencies
responded for 36 of the 37 non-ALJ types.
Figure 15:
Protection from At-Will Removal (n=36)

PROTECTED FROM AT-WILL
REMOVAL?
3

33

No
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Of the 36 non-ALJs types, only three have reported protections from atwill removal (Figure). EEOC Administrative Judges and NLRB Hearing
Officers have protection from removal under their collective-bargaining
agreement.180 The GAO’s AJs, as members of the GAO’s Personnel
Appeals Board, can be removed only for good cause by a majority of the
board (not including the member subject to removal) per statute.181
The absence of protection from at-will removal, however, should not
be given undue weight. Despite the lack of specific protection from atwill removal, non-ALJs typically have civil-service protections that
provide some insulation from possible improper agency retaliation in the
performance-appraisal process.182 Their civil-service protection,
however, is slightly different than that of ALJs. For ALJs, the MSPB

180. In their survey response, the EEOC further indicated that these protections come from
“statute, regulation, [an] internal guidance document, and custom.”
181. See 31 U.S.C. § 751(d) (2018).
182. See Kellie Lunney, Wielding the Ax, GOVEXEC, http://www.govexec.com/
magazine/briefing/2012/07/wielding-ax/56558/ [https://perma.cc/SMD9-4FQL].
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itself decides whether good cause exists for removal.183 But for most of
the civil service,184 an employing agency initially decides whether
removal or discipline is appropriate either to “promote the efficiency of
the service”185 or respond to “unacceptable performance.”186 That
decision is subject to deferential administrative review by the MSPB. 187
Because merely providing a redundant good cause protection for nonALJs would not affect the MSPB’s role in the review, agencies’ efforts
would likely be better spent providing guidance on defining how the
relevant statutory terms (i.e., “efficiency of the service” and
“unacceptable performance”) apply to agency adjudicators.188
C.

Problems with Achieving Optimal Impartiality

Our data, along with data from Professor Michael Asimow’s earlier
ACUS project concerning certain oral hearings,189 indicate that many
agencies have at least some impartiality protections. But these data also
indicate that non-ALJ adjudication is not uniform and that numerous
non-ALJ types lack optimal impartiality provisions. Non-ALJs’ status is
problematic for three reasons.
First, non-ALJs’ impartiality provisions lack the stability of ALJs’.
Custom and numerous forms of internal guidance require little effort to
change, and any change will lack the salience of more formal action. For
example, notice-and-comment rulemaking or even policy statements
require publication in the Federal Register.190 (Indeed, as part of the coauthored report to ACUS from which the reported data comes, we

183. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018) (permitting adverse action against ALJs “only for good cause
established and determined by the [MSPB] on the record after opportunity for hearing before the
Board” (emphasis added)).
184. Slightly different procedures apply to the “Senior Executive Service.” See 5 U.S.C.
§ 3592(a) (requiring a hearing before an official whom the MSPB designates, but not permitting
appeal to the MSPB itself).
185. See 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a).
186. BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, at 69; see 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
187. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1) (reviewing under substantial evidence standard for “unacceptable
performance” adverse actions and under “preponderance of the evidence” standard for efficiencybased actions).
188. BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, at 69–70.
189. See MICHAEL ASIMOW, SOURCEBOOK FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 31 tbl.3 (draft on file with author) (indicating
whether particular studied agency-adjudication schemes adopt certain criteria related to “integrity of
process”).
190. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (requiring publication for interpretive rules and statements
of policy).
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recommended that agencies use notice-and-comment rulemaking for
their impartiality provisions to increase those provisions’ transparency
and salience.191)
Second and relatedly, the hodgepodge of non-ALJ impartiality
provisions undermines transparency because the provisions are often
scattered among various authorities. Our data (not all of which is
presented here) indicate that impartiality protections rest in a host of
forms: notice-and-comment regulations, procedural rules, guidance
documents, and custom. This variety of mechanisms for providing
protections renders the protections less transparent.
Indeed, our survey unexpectedly confirmed this intuition. In
administering our survey, the EEOC at first sent the survey by mistake
to numerous of its non-ALJs, instead of providing a single institutional
answer. Numerous times, the responses were inconsistent. For instance,
the responding non-ALJs provided disparate responses on hiring
qualifications, the permissibility of ex parte communications (and
sources of any limitations), eligibility for bonuses, the existence of caseprocessing goals, limitations on other duties, and even the nature of
administrative appellate review. Strikingly, some of the responding nonALJs indicated that the agency often relied upon custom for various
limitations, the existence of which was apparently unknown to some of
their colleagues. As these responses suggest, transparency benefits not
only the public, but the agency and the non-ALJs, too. One agency’s
transparency also benefits other agencies, which can more easily assess
other agencies’ practices and consider those practices in fashioning their
own procedural schemes.
Finally, agencies do not appear to have considered norms for nonALJ independence in a holistic way. Any particular agency likely creates
adjudicatory procedure infrequently, and the addition of new and
expanded programs presumably arises more organically. Any focus on
process is probably on the nature of the proceedings because that process
is necessary for the first adjudication to begin and because that process
must function as a relatively coherent scheme. Moreover, these
procedural schemes can be borrowed from other adjudications and
tailored in relatively short order. In contrast, impartiality protections are
not as salient, especially because they are often prophylactic measures to
mitigate any risk of partiality.

191. See BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, at 71–72.
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III. IMPARTIALITY DISCLOSURES
Federal hearing officers’ impartiality protections are far from uniform
or optimal, as measured against ALJs’ impartiality protections. Because
of the problems in gathering information on them, it is difficult to
discuss their status and, if necessary, ensure optimal impartiality. As a
remedy, this Part proposes that agencies should use uniform disclosures
like those primarily used in consumer-commercial contexts. Disclosure
regimes provide a mechanism for improving hearing officers’ salience
and indicia of impartiality. With improved salience, Congress will be in
a better position as principal to determine whether government-wide
legislation—perhaps via an “impartiality code”—is suitable.
To be sure, Congress has used various reporting requirements to
oversee agencies, and some literature discusses the history and concerns
over the utility and costs of those reports.192 But the literature on
consumer disclosure is a better guide for three reasons. First, the
consumer-based literature is extremely well-developed theoretically and
practically,193 while the congressional-reporting literature tends to
concentrate on congressional reporting within a specific subject-matter
area or statutory scheme,194 or, as especially true in the political-science
literature, as part of a mix of congressional-oversight mechanisms.195
Second, the impartiality disclosures are not only for Congress. Instead,
they are for Congress, agencies, litigants, and scholars; in fact, my
proposal does not call for direct reporting to Congress. Finally, unlike
annual reports to Congress, which are often criticized for their cost and
ineffectiveness, the proposed disclosure is an extremely concise
document that does not require annual filing.

192. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 66–
67, 106 (2006) (discussing congressional reporting requirements). See generally Jonathan G. Pray,
Comment, Congressional Reporting Requirements: Testing the Limits of the Oversight Power, 76
U. COLO. L. REV. 297 (2005) (discussing history and criticism of congressional reporting
requirements).
193. See infra Section III.A.
194. See generally Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope for
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355 (1991); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in
the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1991);
Joseph Carlton Elliott, Comment, Sleeping with One Eye Open: The Result of Non-Transparent
Oversight by the Office of Refugee Resettlement on Facilities Sheltering Unaccompanied Alien
Children, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 153 (2016).
195. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 128 (1999) (discussing
broader relationship between Congress and Executive in policymaking); Beermann, supra note 192,
at 66–67 (citing and discussing the political science literature on congressional monitoring).
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Purposes of Impartiality Disclosures

Consumer law has long relied upon disclosure models to further
various related objectives in numerous areas, including rent-to-own,196
credit,197 automobile-sales198 and automobile-lease,199 door-to-door,200
securities,201 and banking transactions.202 Disclosures also have a
prominent place in consumer privacy as to internet,203 financial,204 and
health matters.205 The same objectives in the commercial context can, as
discussed in this Section, also apply to the impartiality context.
Consumer disclosure in a commercial context may not come to mind
as a useful tool for improving adjudicatory procedure because consumer
disclosure has a different primary purpose. In the consumer context,
disclosure primarily promotes comparison shopping.206 Or, in the
absence of comparison shopping, disclosure can serve a market function,
providing information to a sufficient number of well-informed
consumers to lead the market, through competing suppliers, to offer
consumers better terms.207 These interrelated objectives are a primary
animating feature of, among others, Truth in Lending (TILA)
196. See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 501 (McKinney 2018) (requiring specific notice and
particular terms of rental agreement).
197. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1602 (2018) (requiring specific disclosures for
credit transactions).
198. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Information & Cost Savings Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 32701–32705
(2018) (requiring disclosure of odometer readings); 16 C.F.R. § 455 (2018) (requiring disclosures
on window of cars for used-car sales); id. § 600 (requiring disclosures concerning fuel economy for
new cars).
199. Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1667(a)–(f).
200. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (requiring disclosure of consumer rights in a door-to-door sale,
including right to cancel).
201. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b)(1) (requiring disclosure of
numerous corporate details for securities registered on a national stock exchange for secondary
trading); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j (requiring disclosures for initial registration
with the SEC).
202. See, e.g., Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4303 (2018); Electric Fund Transfers,
12 C.F.R. § 1005.7 (2018) (disclosures related to debit transactions).
203. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2018) (requiring disclosure of online
privacy policies).
204. See, e.g., Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6802 (requiring disclosures
concerning financial privacy by financial institutions).
205. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2018) (requiring privacy notices to patients concerning health
information).
206. See Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26
UCLA L. REV. 711, 713 (1979).
207. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 668–69 (1979).

04 - Barnett (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

SOME KIND OF HEARING OFFICER

6/18/2019 7:57 PM

565

disclosures, which apply to numerous credit transactions.208 Importantly
for my purposes, this comparison-shopping purpose has only a
tangential role for impartiality disclosure because agencies or Article I
courts rarely compete with other tribunals for cases.209
But subsidiary purposes for consumer disclosure can be key for
impartiality disclosure. First, disclosure can provide a synopsis of
critical contractual provisions.210 Indeed, this is one function of rent-toown disclosures, which must set out monthly payments, purchase price,
various fees, and additional information on the nature of the rental
transaction.211 For adjudicatory procedure, a disclosure regime can help
assemble relevant terms and provide a synopsis of impartiality
provisions. As indicated in Part II, the various indicia are not often
transparently available, collected in one spot, or based on more than
custom. The disclosures seek to cull the relevant criteria and provide a
transparent mechanism for agencies, parties, interest groups, and
Congress to understand and, if necessary, improve the protections for
various kinds of hearing officers. For instance, just as securities
disclosures can expose largely hidden underwriter or executive
compensation,212 impartiality disclosure can bring, say, problematic ex
parte practices to light.
Second, consumer disclosures can provide a warning function to
consumers that a particular term is far from ordinary. For instance, if a
consumer determines that most credit for a particular purpose has an
Annual Percentage Rate (APR) of 8%, a disclosed APR of 88% by one
competitor will alert the consumer that something is amiss with the
transaction.213 Similarly, disclosure can reveal (to lawyers, if not parties)
outlier adjudications that, say, do not have limitations on ex parte
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit . . . .”). Nonetheless, many
argue that disclosure largely fails at achieving these purposes because of consumers’ inability or
disinterest in using disclosed information. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER,
MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 183–84 (2014).
209. The most prominent exceptions are certain commodities-related disputes at issue in CFTC v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836–37 (1986), or certain tax disputes. See David F. Shores, Deferential
Review of Tax Court Decisions: Dobson Revisited, 49 TAX LAW. 629, 629 (1996) (discussing
competition between the Tax Court, federal district courts, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims).
210. See JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 266 (4th ed. 2013).
211. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.621 (West 2018) (describing purpose of disclosures and
other provisions as “ensuring that consumers are adequately informed of all relevant terms” and
“protected from misrepresentations and unfair dealings”).
212. See Dalley, supra note 43, at 1096.
213. See Landers & Rohner, supra note 206, at 737.
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communications or recusal requirements. It may be that a critical
characteristic of independence is justifiably absent for a set of hearing
officers. But the disclosures can ensure that the indicium’s absence is not
merely the result of agency or congressional carelessness. To further this
warning function, the disclosures must be relatively uniform to permit
comparison of similar transactions or forms of agency action, and they
must present important information in a salient way.214
Relatedly, if concerns arise over particular adjudications, the
disclosures can help identify missing impartiality protections that may
help mitigate those concerns. This divergence between optimal
impartiality protections and those that the adjudicator has can reveal an
“impartiality gap.” Recall, for instance, two of our introductory
examples.
The SEC ALJs have APA impartiality protections, and thus they have
optimal impartiality protections as measured against the APA’s
provisions. But concerns over internal pressure at the SEC to rule for the
agency suggests that the APA’s provisions do not guarantee impartiality
or freedom from agency pressure. To mitigate concerns over interagency
pressure, the SEC could provide additional physical separation for its
ALJs from the rest of the agency.
Immigration judges, as a second example, have many of the
recommended protections including hiring qualifications, prohibitions
on other functions and ex parte communications, physical separation,
and the lack of eligibility for bonuses. But they are subject to
performance reviews, and they lack special protection from removal.215
The current concern is that these performance reviews are not crafted to
divorce substantive outcomes in decided cases from the performance
review and any discipline that may follow.216
Impartiality gaps may seem obvious for high-profile adjudications
like those for the SEC or for immigration matters. But even with highprofile examples, the identification of impartiality gaps can help focus
attention on the specific nature of the problem, such as the nature of
performance appraisals and the lack of defined protection from at-will
removal, within the larger context of administrative adjudication. For
less salient adjudications, these disclosures may be the only way in
which the absence of impartiality protections comes to light. For
instance, the 535 Decision Review Officers for the VA have no

214. See id. at 738.
215. ACUS Response Spreadsheet, Types of Non-ALJs (on file with author).
216. See id.
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prohibitions on ex parte communications, no separations of functions, no
physical separation, performance appraisals, and no especial protection
from at-will removal.217 These missing protections suggest a significant
impartiality gap that may otherwise go unnoticed.
Third, consumer disclosure creates trust between parties to an
agreement. This practice furthers dignitary interests by allowing
consumers the opportunity to read and understand the nature of the
transactions.218 This value may be more pronounced in the impartiality
context.219 With process, the regulated individuals may have no choice
about the process or tribunal. But disclosure can ensure that the
government recognizes the individual’s interest in understanding the
nature of the adjudication, and it can improve the individual’s and
public’s trust in agency action by removing concern over inadvertently
or purposefully opaque procedure. The clarity that disclosure provides
may be especially useful in a context in which the hearing officers often
have the title “judge” but lack protections that laypeople and even
lawyers would presuppose. That said, as discussed in Section III.C,
disclosure will improve litigants’ satisfaction with negative outcomes
and thereby create public trust only if a disclosure reveals wellconceived impartiality protections or if disclosure of lackluster
impartiality provisions nudges the agency towards adopting them.
Fourth, consumer disclosure can guide consumers towards certain
normative preferences. For instance, Congress determined that its
longstanding required word-based warnings on tobacco products were
not effectively countering consumers’ biases or miscalculation of
tobacco’s health risks.220 To account for consumers’ insufficient
appreciation of health risks, Congress replaced those warnings with
graphic pictures of lung disease to invoke an emotional response in
potential tobacco users.221 In the procedural context, the agency may not
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 734–35 (2011) (discussing asserted dignitary value to disclosure and related
authorities); cf. Richard W. Bourne, Medical Malpractice: Should Courts Force Doctors to Confess
Their Own Negligence to Their Patients, 61 ARK. L. REV. 621, 623 (2009) (considering the
disclosure of professional errors to affected patients).
219. See David Aaron, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor’s Duty to
Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3005, 3015 (1999) (noting
government’s responsibility to protect dignitary interests in criminal law because of the
government’s role as representing society).
220. Id.
221. Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L.
REV. 1021, 1028–36 (2015) (discussing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
of 2009, 21 U.S.C. § 387 (2018)).
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need to ascertain risks in the same ways as a potential smoker might. But
the APA and the Court’s due process jurisprudence suggest that agencies
provide optimal independence for hearing officers when they address
hearing officers’ hiring, pay, removal, and decisionmaking process.
Disclosures can encourage agencies to adopt optimal process by creating
a mechanism for public shame if their hearing officers’ structured
independence deviates from optimal and—if the disclosure is effective—
more standardized design. Even without shame, disclosure can help
channel “herd behavior”—getting agencies to follow what they perceive
others to be doing.222 This herding can mitigate some concerns over
agencies lacking expertise in designing impartiality protections without
significant guidance.
Fifth, impartiality disclosures can reduce principal-agency costs, a
purpose that is less often germane to consumer transactions.223 By
having agencies disclose key procedural provisions in a transparent and
understandable fashion, Congress can better monitor agencies to
ascertain how agencies are using their delegated authority. A meaningful
disclosure regime that creates a synopsis of important terms and permits
easy comparison of similar agency action is much more useful to a
principal than a disclosure regime in which the information is found in
numerous materials and requires the principal to synthesize and analyze
the information. Indeed, Congress requires something similar in other
spheres. For instance, it requires agencies to file impact statements for
government actions with major environmental effects. Congress also
requires under the Community Reinvestment Act224 that banks (with all
of the benefits that national banking laws provide them225) disclose their
outreach to various disadvantaged communities when seeking
regulators’ approval of pending mergers.226 In both of these examples,

222. Dalley, supra note 43, at 1115.
223. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995) (“[T]he principal purpose of mandatory disclosure [in securities markets,
as opposed to other consumer transactions] is to address certain agency problems that arise between
corporate promoters and investors, and between corporate managers and shareholders. Disclosure
can help reduce the cost of monitoring promoters’ and managers’ use of corporate assets for selfinterested purposes.”).
224. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2018).
225. See generally Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1283 (2014) (describing how banking charters are intended to inure to the public’s benefit).
226. See, e.g., Dalley, supra note 43, at 1122–23 (noting that Community Reinvestment Act
disclosure, as part of banking mergers, has led to changes in lending practices); Cheryl Lee,
Amalgamation of the Southern California Banking Industry: San Diego a Microcosm, 35 CAL. W.
L. REV. 41, 116 (1998) (“Along with federal and state antitrust laws that apply to interstate banking,
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Congress uses disclosure regimes to influence agent actors or regulated
parties’ behavior and to render their action more salient to interested
parties, which, in turn, can alert congressional monitors.
Finally, consumer disclosures can also have a law-reform function by
revealing what were once unfair, hidden terms.227 Disclosure may be a
tool for centering public attention on a particular issue.228 For instance,
the complexity and incomprehensibility of disclosed provisions led to a
movement in the states for “simple English forms”229 in consumer
contracts and in certain federal privacy disclosures.230 In the impartiality
context, disclosure can help reveal problematic non-ALJ regimes in one
adjudication, in one agency, or across the administrative state.231 A
disclosure would become a tool of numerous constituencies—agencies
themselves, Congress, and interest groups—to improve the status quo.232
Importantly, disclosure in general is useful for reform objectives even if
some constituencies or litigants ignore the disclosures. As in the
consumer context, only some actors need to understand and use
disclosures for them to have a meaningful impact on a disclosing party’s
practice.233
B.

Key Considerations for Impartiality Disclosure

Despite disclosure’s utility, it can prove unhelpful or even backfire.
As Professor Daniel E. Ho has demonstrated, unthoughtful disclosures
can fail to further their underlying goals. For instance, he notes that
disclosures can be too complicated for consumers’ use, as with Safe
Drinking Water Act disclosures234 or credit disclosures.235 Or disclosures
the Federal Reserve Board must also consider Community Reinvestment Act compliance in
connection with any merger or acquisition application.”).
227. See Landers & Rohner, supra note 206, at 741.
228. See Dalley, supra note 43, at 1112.
229. See Landers & Rohner, supra note 206, at 741 n.101.
230. 16 C.F.R. § 313.3 (2018) (requiring that the certain privacy notices under the Gramm-LeachBliley Act be “reasonably understandable” and defining the concept in great detail).
231. See Dalley, supra note 43, at 1110–11 (noting that disclosure of securities information can
be useful to the government itself in determining how to better regulate).
232. See Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1379
(2015) (noting how disclosure that consumers understand can lead consumers to think more deeply
about the matter at issue and create a bridge to substantive regulation).
233. See, e.g., SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 210, at 266 (discussing the market-function of
consumer disclosure and the need for some consumers to pay attention to the disclosures).
234. See Daniel E. Ho, Designing Information Disclosure, 38 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 13, 13 (2012).
235. The comprehensibility problem with TILA disclosures is a longstanding one. See Jeffrey
Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1345–46 (1982) (pointing
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can be so inaccessible—such as privacy disclosures in obscure
locations236 or provided with other abundant information237—that they
are unlikely to prove effective.238 Even restaurant health disclosures—
”widely considered a paragon of disclosure regulation”239 due to their
easy-to-understand and prominent letter grades based on an inspector’s
underlying rubric—can do little to signal degrees of sanitation if the
grading lacks consistency among inspectors, suffers from grade
inflation, or has so many detailed grading objectives that they hinder
reliability among different inspectors.240 Perhaps even worse, disclosures
can have unintended consequences that exacerbate harms that the
disclosure seek to mitigate. For instance, calorie disclosures can lead
restaurant patrons to increase their calorie consumption by purchasing
several lower-calorie foods that in the aggregate have more calories than
a single high-calorie item.241
This Section considers the main issues in the design of impartiality
disclosures. After determining which values the disclosures seek to
further, one must consider which criteria are germane to those
underlying values, how to communicate the information in the
disclosure, and how to distribute the disclosure to ensure that the
relevant audiences can easily find the disclosed information. And, of
course, the disclosure design must ensure that the costs of the disclosure
are less than its benefits.

to studies indicating that TILA has had no market impact and stating that “[t]he resulting [TILA]
disclosure statement is nearly incomprehensible to the average consumer; the information essential
to making good credit-use decisions lies buried under mounds of superfluous data”).
236. Although California is one of the few states to require disclosure of privacy policies, see
SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 210, at 532, those policies need not be posted on the company’s
webpage; they may instead be posted as a hyperlink on the “first significant page after entering the
Web site.” See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575(a), 22577(b)(1) (West 2018).
237. Regulations to Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial disclosures permit sellers to “combine [the
required disclosures] with other information,” creating an incentive for sellers to bury the
disclosures in other consumer correspondence. Regulation P, 12 C.F.R. § 1016.3(b)(2)(ii)(E)
(2018).
238. See Dalley, supra note 43, at 1091. If consumers notice privacy-policy disclosures, they are
likely to misunderstand their import. “[I]nstead of reading the policies, consumers assume that a
firm with a ‘privacy policy’ has a policy of keeping consumer data private”—though a privacy
policy may indicate that the firm will widely share the consumer’s information. Willis, supra note
232, at 1326.
239. Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122
YALE L.J. 574, 582 (2012).
240. See id. at 611–14, 640–41.
241. See Ho, supra note 234, at 13.
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Designing the Disclosure

Ascertaining the appropriate criteria concerning hearing-officer
impartiality is the relatively easy part because the germane factors for
optimal hearing-officer independence are the familiar ones from the
APA, the Court’s due process jurisprudence, and my recent survey:
Hiring process (including who hires and established criteria,
if any, for hiring);
Separation of functions;
Supervisory relationship within the agency;
Ex parte communications;
Physical separation;
Performance appraisals;
Eligibility for performance bonuses; and
Protection from at-will removal
The more difficult questions concern the design of the disclosure.
The disclosure must also be a concise document. The longer the
document, the less likely that it will be read and the more likely that the
information will be obscured.242 If it is not read, the document cannot
prove a meaningful warning, shame sufficiently to push agencies in a
better direction, or clearly identify concerns for congressional
consideration. Relatedly, brevity permits the disclosure to provide a
synopsis, as opposed to an exposition, of the hearing-officer’s status. By
limiting the disclosure to the eight criteria listed above with a limited
agency response for each criterion, the disclosure will better achieve its
purposes. Because comparison among agencies and adjudications is
necessary to further nearly all of these goals, the disclosures must also
be uniform.243
The concise disclosure must also be readable for lay litigants and
attorneys who do not delve into adjudicatory structure frequently. The
disclosure should be written in a readable font that seeks to ensure, in as

242. See Bubb, supra note 221, at 1026; Dalley, supra note 43, at 1115. Moreover, firms are
aware that psychological forces (such as a line of people waiting impatiently behind a customer with
disclosures in hand at a car-rental counter) can dissuade consumers from reading disclosures. See
Willis, supra note 232, at 1325.
243. The use of uniformity to permit comparison is a feature of numerous disclosure regimes.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2018) (stating that Congress requires uniform disclosures to improve
competition and consumer decisionmaking under the Truth in Savings Act); Rule Notice, Truth in
Lending, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,129 (Sept. 27, 2000) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2018)) (stating that
“[u]niformity in creditors’ disclosures [under the Truth in Lending Act] is intended to assist
consumers in comparison shopping”).
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plain of language as possible, that the recipient can understand the nature
and import of the terms.244 For instance, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, when revising its disclosure forms for certain
residential mortgages not only used statutorily-mandated terms, such as
“finance charge” and “Annual Percentage Rate (APR),” but also
explanations of what the terms meant (and did not mean).245 As one
example, with APR, the agency briefly defined it as “[y]our costs over
the loan term expressed as a rate. This is not your interest rate.”246 The
agency did so to mitigate consumer confusion, uncovered in its testing,
between the APR (which includes interest, fees, and other costs of the
loan) and interest rates.247
Disclosures often follow one of two models—what I refer to as either
a “presentation model” or a “synthesis model.” Under the former, the
disclosure simply presents the required criteria without attempting to
synthesize or analyze it for recipients. Forms for TILA, the Truth in
Savings Act, and Rent-to-Own transactions, among others, follow this
model by mandating the disclosure of information like costs and fees
without assessing the desirability of the particular transaction. The
synthesis model, in contrast, takes the applicable criteria and analyzes it
to provide the recipient with a conclusion as to this subject of the
disclosure. Perhaps the most well-known example of the synthesis model
is the earlier mentioned letter-grade-based disclosure system for
restaurants. Similarly, based on their algorithms, publications rank
universities and colleges to help students and schools evaluate the “best”
schools.
The benefit of the presentation model is that it does not require an
intermediary to administer or a reliable rubric to ensure consistency
among numerous intermediaries. But its downside is that it leaves the
disclosure recipient to make sense of the presented information. The
244. Matters like font and placement are ubiquitous factors in disclosure design. See Willis, supra
note 232, at 1349–50. The FTC has indicated that these are “important considerations,” but they are not
sufficient to ensure effective disclosure. FTC, .COM DISCLOSURES: HOW TO MAKE EFFECTIVE
DISCLOSURES IN DIGITAL ADVERTISING 1 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plainlanguage/bus41-dot-com-disclosures-information-about-online-advertising.pdf [http://perma.cc/N6BQJJTV].
245. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, TILA–RESPA INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE: GUIDE TO THE
LOAN
ESTIMATE
AND
CLOSING
DISCLOSURE
FORMS
108
(May
2018),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_kbyo_guide-loan-estimate-and-closingdisclosure-forms_v2.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSD2-9QGU].
246. Id.
247. Rule Notice, Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 79,730, 79,979 (Dec.
31, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024, 1026 (2018)).
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synthesis model’s beneficial feature, in contrast, is that it can provide an
understandable compilation of the tested variables in a format that is
very familiar to those outside the targeted industry. The downside is that
it requires an intermediary to provide the synthesis. The presence of
more than an evaluator or grader requires checks for consistency and
reliability in grading; the use of an algorithm requires validity testing
and attention to whether subject parties can “game” the algorithm.248 The
simplicity of the letter grade or ranking also may obscure the complexity
in the grading variables and application.
For impartiality disclosures, the presentation model is preferable. By
limiting the disclosed criteria, the disclosure can effectively provide
information that furthers the purposes of the disclosure (synopsis,
warning, etc.), especially for lawyers, Congress, and the agencies
themselves. To be sure, less sophisticated litigants may appreciate a
synthesis model with, say, a letter grade that evaluates the hearing
officer’s independence. But that model would create significant costs:
deciding who evaluates, assuring reliability in creating a grading rubric,
determining how to ensure valid rubrics after accounting for legitimate
reasons for certain hearing officers to deviate from the norm, and
preventing the inadvertent masking of potential impartiality failings
within the grading calculus. By calling for an explanation only when
agencies answer a certain way, the presentation-model disclosure can
subtly indicate when agencies are deviating from the optimal course.
Finally, the agencies must consider for which of their hearing officers
they should provide a disclosure. Defining non-ALJ hearings is
notoriously difficult because of their varied characteristics. The agencies
could choose to use our definition (i.e., hearings in which the parties can
seek an oral, evidentiary hearing).249 Or they may choose to use a
similar, although perhaps narrower definition from another ACUS
project. In an earlier project, ACUS adopted a definition of “Type B”
hearings: mandatory evidentiary hearings (whether written or oral) that
have an exclusive record and are not heard by ALJs.250 For ease of
248. See Dalley, supra note 43, at 1128 (discussing “gaming” by law schools for the U.S. News
and World Report survey and bypass-surgery report cards).
249. For the full definition, see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
250. See MICHAEL ASIMOW, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADJUDICATION OUTSIDE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 5, 10 (2016) (defining “evidentiary hearing” and distinguishing “Type
B” hearings from “Type C” hearings), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/adjudicationoutside-the-administrative-procedure-act-draft-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6H5-X8F6]; Adoption of
Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314 (Dec. 13, 2016). The main difference between the definitions is that
the one in our report only includes oral hearings, and it did not require an exclusive record or that the
hearing be mandatory (as opposed to those that the agency had to hold upon a party’s request).
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categorization, agencies may prefer limiting the relevant non-ALJ
hearings to those with exclusive records, those that permit oral
proceedings, or those that are mandatory. Regardless of how different
definitions alter the domain of the disclosures, the disclosures can prove
useful for numerous agencies and proceedings.
Appendix A provides a model form based on these considerations.251
2.

Distribution

A successful disclosure requires appropriate distribution to render it
more likely that recipients will use disclosure to achieve its purposes. To
that end, the agency should include it with other materials that it
provides at the initiation of a hearing and in the same format as those
other materials, whether as a separate document, conspicuous link, or
conspicuous attachment.252 By ensuring that the party receives it at the
beginning of the hearing, it renders it more likely that the party can take
any actions necessary to preserve issues concerning the hearing officer’s
independence.253
The agency should also place the disclosure with other materials
(such as rules, docket pages, and other guidance) on its website. Not
only are some regulated parties likely to find the disclosure online,
conspicuous posting makes it easier for other agencies, congressional
staffs, and other interested parties to find the document for particular
proceedings. Indeed, ACUS has recently adopted a recommendation for
agencies to make their adjudicatory materials more conspicuously
available on their websites.254
Agencies should also send their disclosures to a clearinghouse only as
they create or revise them. Collecting all disclosures will better enable
scholars or government actors to synthesize government-wide practice
and consider any appropriate uniform reforms. Annual disclosure to the
clearinghouse would likely prove too burdensome and, if the impartiality
251. See infra Appendix A.
252. If the agency chooses to provide paper copies, the costs of disclosure will increase. To
mitigate these costs, the agency could choose to print the disclosure on the back of another
document, as long as the front of the document clearly puts the recipient on notice of the
disclosure’s existence on the back of the page.
253. Some disclosure regimes require certain recurring disclosures. See DEE PRIDGEN &
RICHARD ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 8:4 (2018) (discussing timing of openend-credit TILA disclosures); id. § 13:17 (discussing annual Gramm-Leach-Bliley financialinformation disclosures). Disclosures concerning hearing officers do not need to occur more than
once. It is difficult to see what benefit repeated disclosure would provide, especially if the
disclosures are available online with the hearing’s other materials.
254. See Adoption of Recommendations, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,039 (June 16, 2017).
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provisions are static after their creation, unnecessary. But the downside
is that agencies may simply not remember to submit revised disclosures,
and they may largely forget, without the nudge of an annual reporting
requirement, to think about whether to update their disclosures. On
balance, other constituencies may be able to help nudge the agency into
reconsidering the disclosures and impartiality protections if necessary,
and an annual (or biannual) reminder by the clearinghouse may help
assuage fears of agencies overlooking the disclosures once they have
drafted them. Agencies should send the disclosures in a format to the
clearinghouse that allows machine-based reading and analysis,255 so that
the clearinghouse can easily identify outliers and analyze trends or
characteristics across all federal agency adjudication.
ACUS is one possible clearinghouse because its mission is “to
promote improvements in the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the
procedures by which federal agencies conduct regulatory
programs . . . through scholarly research” and recommendations to
Congress and agencies.256 Indeed, ACUS not only commissioned the
underlying empirical project discussed here on hearing officers’
independence, but they have recently focused on agency adjudication
and created an online database of information on agency adjudications of
all stripes.257 To be sure, serving as a clearinghouse would be a new duty
for ACUS. Yet, unlike regimes with annual disclosures or disclosures
that potentially apply to all recurring substantive agency decisions (such
as certain rulemakings),258 the impartiality disclosures would require
only initial and revised disclosures for any relevant non-ALJ
adjudication. Of course, to assess a suitable government clearinghouse
(whether ACUS or another entity), one would have to consider the
agency’s budget, other duties, and staffing—considerations that are
outside the scope of this Article.
Finally, if necessary, these disclosures should be mandatory. Based on
agencies’ high response rate to our survey, I am hopeful that agencies
255. See Ho, supra note 234, at 580–81 (discussing guidance from the Obama Administration’s
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs on machine-readable disclosures).
256. David M. Pritzker, ACUS in a Nutshell, ADMIN. CONF. U.S. (July 17, 2013),
https://www.acus.gov/newsroom/administrative-fix-blog/acus-nutshell [https://perma.cc/C263-L5G8].
257. For a collection of ACUS reports concerning adjudication, see Adjudication, ADMIN. CONF.
U.S., https://www.acus.gov/past-projects/adjudication [https://perma.cc/E9KY-SFJN]; Ongoing
Projects, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., https://www.acus.gov/current-projects [https://perma.cc/9MFK-3A8T].
258. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 192, at 83–84 (discussing the Congressional Review Act);
Doris S. Freedman et al., The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Orienting Federal Regulation to Small
Business, 93 DICK. L. REV. 439, 442 (1989) (discussing annual reporting by the Small Business
Administration under the Regulatory Flexibility Act).
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will voluntarily disclose. Voluntary disclosure is a good starting point,
and an agency’s mere refusal to disclose voluntarily may provide
sufficient signaling to Congress to inquire further. But given agencies’
practice of turning away from ALJs and failing to provide non-ALJs
similar protections, I am skeptical that a sufficient number of agencies
will voluntarily disclose non-ALJ protections. After all, as I have argued
elsewhere, agencies have largely (though wrongly) determined that the
current system of using non-ALJs with lesser independence benefits
them.259 The mandate, if necessary, can come from two sources. As a
helpful start, the White House (likely through OMB) could mandate
disclosure for executive agencies in the manner proposed here. The
downsides are that OMB’s relationship with independent agencies is
fraught and that OMB (through its Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs) focuses primarily on agency rulemaking, not adjudication.260
The other option is for Congress to mandate the disclosures via statute.
The benefit is that agencies will be required to comply. But, as proposed
revisions to the APA have demonstrated over the decades,261 statutory
change to administrative process comes slowly, if at all. The lack of
political valence as to impartial agency adjudicators gives one more
hope for these disclosures, however. After all, progressives want
impartial non-ALJs who preside over hearings with vulnerable
populations (say, immigrants),262 while conservatives seek to ensure a
fair administrative process for corporate regulated entities.263
C.

Possible Objections

Disclosure is no panacea. There are legitimate concerns about its use
and effectiveness. But these objections do not undermine disclosure’s
utility in the impartiality context.
First, congressional action, especially if providing uniform treatment
to hearing officers, would be a more efficient and effective way of
regulating impartiality. Moreover, the concerns over substantive
259. See generally Barnett, supra note 33, at 1670–1708.
260. See KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 101–09 (2d ed. 2014).
261. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN.
L. REV. 629 (2017) (discussing earlier attempted reforms of the APA and current pending ones).
262. See generally Jill E. Family, Immigration Law Allies and Administrative Law Adversaries,
32 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 99 (2017).
263. See generally Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Criticizes SEC’s In-House
Court, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-chamber-of-commercecriticizes-secs-in-house-court-1436932861 [https://perma.cc/LCL3-Y49G] (discussing concern over
the partiality of SEC ALJs by industry and its interest group, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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regulation in the consumer context—that it stifles innovation and can
lead to inefficiencies in the market264—do not apply here assuming that
the impartiality criteria are optimal and fixed for all hearing officers.
But, as indicated earlier, the lack of information up to this point on
hearing officers—both as to their significant place in the bureaucracy
and their protections—has rendered substantive regulation by
congressional oversight difficult. Of course, the data presented here, as
well as from other sources, provide Congress a basis to begin its
oversight. But agency-provided disclosures can provide updated data,
citations, and explanations for all relevant non-ALJ hearings (not just the
ones that voluntarily respond). In short, impartiality disclosure is a first
step in helping bring about improvement—whether from agencies in the
first instance or from congressional oversight.
Second, disclosure regimes have largely been deemed failures and
thus their efficacy here may be in doubt.265 But the aims of consumer
disclosure and impartiality disclosure differ. The most trenchant
criticism of disclosure regimes concerns their inability to alter consumer
behavior.266 Here, it is not the consumers’ behavior that we seek to
change. Instead, we seek to change the provider’s behavior (the agency)
or the overseer’s (Congress).
But, relatedly, might the disclosures normalize lackluster impartiality
protections if it turns out that most agencies have not sufficiently
protected their adjudicators’ impartiality? This is a possibility, but there
are good reasons to think that result would not materialize. If an
agency’s more ample protections have worked well, the agency has little
incentive to race to the bottom. Were an agency, however, to justify its
minimal protections by pointing to other agencies’ minimal practices,
other constituencies—litigants, Congress, or interest groups—could
pressure the agency to change. In short, once information permits
numerous constituencies to identify problems, the chance for mitigation
or resolution is higher than if the problem remains shrouded.
In fact, well-designed process can inure to an agency’s benefit by
increasing the chances that losing litigants accept the proceedings as

264. See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 715 (2006).
265. See Willis, supra note 232, at 1321–22.
266. See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward
a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 148–49 (2006)
(discussing the problems with disclosure-regimes as regulation). See generally BEN-SHAHAR &
SCHNEIDER, supra note 208 (discussing the various ways in which consumer disclosure has failed to
inform or alter consumer behavior).
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generally fair. Social psychologists’ work on procedural justice have
demonstrated that procedural fairness affects how parties perceive the
fairness of a decision’s outcome.267 Although they did not consider the
effect of impartiality itself, some studies have demonstrated that effects
of procedural fairness or the lack thereof are strongest when parties
suffer a negative outcome under the process.268 The wrinkle here is that
impartiality disclosures may exacerbate losing parties’ dissatisfaction
with agency adjudications by calling litigants’ attention to impartiality
gaps. Yet, filling those gaps or disclosing well-designed impartiality
provisions can improve losing litigants’ satisfaction with agency
adjudication. Impartiality disclosures, accordingly, may increase
dissatisfaction in the short-term but serve as a catalyst for decreasing
that dissatisfaction in the long run.
Third, it is unclear whether any of the relevant constituencies will use
the disclosure.269 Consumers, for instance, are overwhelmed with
disclosed information, rendering it easy to tune out, click through, or use
in incorrect ways.270 In fact, regulated entities in the consumer context
often intentionally present their disclosures in ways that ensure that they
are not read.271 Moreover, the cost of additional disclosure is often
miniscule, or at least appears so, exacerbating hyper-disclosure and
consumers’ negative reactions to it.272 In contrast, there is a dearth of
impartiality disclosure, and the model form is intended to address the
concern over hyper-disclosure by limiting the variables that are
addressed on the one-page disclosure. Unlike consumer disclosures,
which are often provided shortly before a transaction is consummated,273
these impartiality disclosures are intended to be a starting point for
agencies and Congress to focus their attention on important criteria as

267. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 67
(1988).
268. See id. at 67–69.
269. See Bubb, supra note 221, at 1021.
270. See id. at 1026 (discussing phenomenon of “decision aversion” in which consumers invest as
little time as possible in decisionmaking and thus ignore disclosures).
271. See Willis, supra note 232, at 1322–23.
272. See Bubb, supra note 221, at 1021; Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 434–47 (2003)
(discussing problems with understanding and processing ever-increasing disclosure in securities
markets).
273. See, e.g., Nash v. First Fin. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 703 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1983) (“There is
abundant authority for the proposition that a violation of [the Truth in Lending] Act occurs when the
new credit transaction is ‘consummated’, or when credit is extended, without the requisite
disclosure having been made.”).
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working groups, committees, and managers think about how to provide
optimal impartiality. These groups can turn to ACUS recommendations
and reports and scholarship that provide agencies’ guidance on non-ALJ
impartiality.274 After using the disclosures to focus on problematic
hearing-officer regimes, agencies and Congress can seek more
information as necessary to address specific problems.
Fourth, agency disclosure is not costless. But the costs of disclosure—
especially as minimal as this one-page disclosure is when compared to
pages and pages of various consumer disclosures for one transaction or
reports to Congress—are largely ones that Congress has accepted in
numerous other areas. And the costs should be compared to the benefits,
which, as discussed in Section III.A., are likely more significant in this
context than in the consumer one. Moreover, the costs for impartiality
disclosures are largely upfront costs, where the agency (re)considers its
non-ALJ hearings and completes the disclosure. The transmission costs
of posting to the internet and transmitting it to a clearinghouse are slight.
More significant costs, however, arise from routine distribution to
litigants (if the agency does not simply provide a website link to its
disclosure), the clearinghouse’s duties, and any agency’s duties in
enforcing a mandatory-disclosure regime. This Article is not the place to
attempt to quantify those costs but, given the numerous other disclosure
regimes that Congress requires, the costs here are likely similar in kind
to, yet much smaller in degree than, those for other programs.
Congressional budgeting professionals can very likely assess these costs
in short order.
Finally, the use of disclosures would not encourage transparency for
what Professor David Pozen has recently suggested are nefarious ends.
Pozen contends that transparency suffers from ideological drift.275
Transparency was originally a tool by progressives to further goals such
as professionalizing government, fairness, and mitigating agency
capture.276 But transparency has morphed into a tool to obstruct
government, whether by inundating agencies with requests under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); demanding open meetings that
perversely push lobbyists into private meetings with regulators;
274. See Barnett, supra note 33 (recommending that agencies use ALJs because of their statutory
protections); Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312 (Dec. 13, 2016) (recommending,
among other things, the adoption of certain impartiality provisions). See generally Bremer, supra
note 44; BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, at 60–71 (recommending the adoption of numerous
impartiality provisions).
275. David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100 (2018).
276. Id. at 113.
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providing lobbyists with better oversight of legislators’ behavior; or
offering transparency as a sufficient, yet unobtrusive, regulatory device
in the place of meaningful substantive regulation.277 For my purposes
here, I assume that Pozen is correct in categorizing the nature of
transparency’s drift and uses.
Impartiality disclosures, however, would further beneficial goals.
Impartiality disclosures’ raison d’être is to encourage a professional
adjudicator corps and provide an impartial tribunal for all parties. The
disclosures would not easily become tools to undermine agency action
(except to the extent that a badly designed adjudicatory process should
not function). Regulated parties would not be able to use numerous
burdensome requests for disclosure to hamper an agency (as under
FOIA) because the proposed impartiality disclosure only requires
agencies to disclose the nature of their hearing officers initially and
revise them if necessary. Finally, aside from policymaking that
incidentally adheres in designing agency hearings, these disclosures do
not concern the substance of any particular decision or seek to replace
any kind of substantive regulatory policy. Accordingly, problems
associated with legislator oversight, open meetings, and consumer
disclosure regimes do not exist here as to specific, substantive
regulation.
CONCLUSION
Impartiality disclosures are a relatively low-cost way of providing
significant information to scholars, litigants, Congress, and agencies
themselves about the current state of administrative adjudication. They
provide a mechanism for obtaining complete and updated data for
proceedings that are often forgotten or confused with others. As the
findings reported here demonstrate, agency practice is extremely diverse
and likely far from optimal. Disclosures may prove sufficient by
themselves to alter agency behavior and bring us closer to optimal
impartiality in administrative adjudication. Or they may serve as a tool
for considering whether and to what extent Congress should promulgate
government-wide impartiality protections for non-ALJs. After all,
ACUS and scholars have already provided significant theoretical
guidance on how agencies should think about adjudicatory
impartiality.278 What is needed now is action. The time has come to

277. See id. at 123–40.
278. See supra note 274.
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move away from some kind of hearing officer and toward an optimal
one, using impartiality disclosures as a first step.
Today’s political climate presents a prime opportunity for using
impartiality disclosures. The Trump Administration has begun altering
ALJs’ protections as to hiring and, if the courts agree, to removal. In
short, ALJs are beginning to look more like non-ALJs. And the
Administration has proposed altering the performance review of one
group of non-ALJs—immigration judges—by permitting more agency
oversight and rendering removal of those judges easier. As the
Administration begins altering non-ALJ’s impartiality protections, it is
imperative that transparent, up-to-date information exist so that litigants
in agency proceedings and Congress know of the changes and are able to
place those changes in context. As administrative adjudication gains
public attention, impartiality disclosures can, for once, help the public
focus not only on its foibles—but also its ability to provide fair, efficient
proceedings.
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